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This paper outlines a "hermeneutic theory of democracy" 
and uses it to analyze the debate between liberal 
individualists and communitarians regarding citizenship. The 
hermeneutic approach offers fresh insight into each of these 
perspectives and facilitates substantive communication between 
them by drawing out implications of the emphasis they both 
place on democratic processes. Hermeneutic theory conceives of 
democracy as a two-sided process. The first half of the 
hermeneutic circle sees the shared understandings and culture 
of the community as constitutive of the individual. The second 
half sees individuals, in all their diversity, as constitutive 
of the matrix of shared understandings and culture. It is 
argued that the communitarian view of citizenship and 
democracy, by insisting that the community is (or ought to be) 
antecedent to the individual, emphasizes the first half of the 
hermeneutic circle, while the liberal individualist 
perspective, which stresses that the individual is (or ought 
to be) antecedent to the community, emphasize the second half. 
This paper, then, calls attention to the foundational 
imbalances in liberal individualism and communitarianism which 
in turn produce truncated models of the citizen, the 
community, and democratic processes. In liberal individualism 
and communitarianism we find reified segments of democratic 
processes rather than functioning components and an animated 
whole. By contrast, the identity of the hermeneutic self is 
not fully autonomous or entirely socially-constituted, but 
rather an integrated combination of individuated and communal 
factors. Accordingly, in the hermeneutic model, neither the 
individual nor the community is considered epistemologically 
antecedent to the other. In hermeneutic democracy, the 
interdependent functioning of both halves of the hermeneutic 
circle constitutes the cycle of democratic processes. The 
paper concludes that the hermeneutic model serves two 
purposes. First, it provides a discrete, moderate theory of 
citizenship and democracy capable of communicating on common 
ground with both liberal individualists and communitarians. 
Second, by avoiding the unwarranted constraints of 
antecedence, it offers a balanced alternative theory of 
citizenship in the often implacable debate between liberal 
individualists and communitarians.
COMMUNITARIANISM, LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE MYTH OF 
ANTECEDENCE: A DEMOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE CITIZENSHIP 
DEBATE BETWEEN LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISTS AND COMMUNITARIANS
Introduction
The issue of citizenship, with the various theoretical 
and practical questions it raises, is a primary forum for 
the debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians. The project undertaken in this essay is to 
assess the controversy between liberal individualists and 
communitarians on the topic of citizenship through the lens 
of what I will call hermeneutic democracy. My thesis is that 
this approach offers fresh insight into both perspectives 
and facilitates substantive communication between them by 
drawing out implications of the emphasis they each place on 
significant facets of democratic processes.
For liberal individualists, the individual is 
antecedent to and constitutive of the community. Conversely, 
for communitarians, community is antecedent to and 
constitutive of the individual. We shall see that 
contrasting views on the nature and constitution of the self 
are at the root of these differences. Since each perspective 
uses a model of the self to construct the prototype of a 
citizen, the trajectories set by differences at this level 
result in vastly disparate standpoints. Liberal 
individualists postulate autonomous individuals entering
2
3society from the state of nature. Communitarian tenets are 
grounded in the framework of socially-constituted humans as 
members of communities. Upon analysis, however, it will 
become evident that communitarians and liberal 
individualists rely on an assumption of democracy in 
depictions of the citizen and the relationship between the 
citizen and the polity. Moreover, in both cases, the 
benefits afforded by the inclusion of democracy are 
indispensable although generally unacknowledged.
In order to establish a vantage point from which we may 
examine the communitarian and liberal individualist views of 
citizenship and the aspects of democracy which they embrace, 
it is essential to delineate hermeneutic democracy as a 
discrete model. Hermeneutic theory conceives of democracy as 
a two-sided process, where the first half sees shared 
understandings and culture as constituting the individual, 
and the second half sees individuals, in all their 
diversity, as constituting the matrix of shared culture and 
understandings.
In the first half of the hermeneutical circle, citizens 
share membership in a polity, partake of a common socio­
political culture, and are collectively impacted at various 
times by a slate of salient communal issues. These areas of 
commonality are the infrastructure for communicative 
interaction. Public discourse and policy formulation within 
the context of community are the initial half of the
4processes which comprise the circle of hermeneutic 
democracy. This portion of the hermeneutic circle reflects 
the impact of community on the identity of the self, and the 
activity of the socially-constituted aspects of the self.
The second half of the circle is the activity of 
citizens as individual deliberators engaged in the appraisal 
of communal norms and consensus. The dialectics of community 
life augment individual and collective self-understandings, 
including enhancing the capacity for individual and 
collective self-evaluation. The ongoing reexamination of the 
community by its citizens is a reflection of the impact of 
individuals on the community, and the activity of the 
individuated, autonomous facets of the self. This half of 
the hermeneutic circle sustains the vitality of political 
processes and upholds the status of citizenship by averting 
the influence of unexamined assumptions and outmoded 
precedents. While we anticipate that some voices will be 
more influential than others, incorporation of the dynamics 
of critical self-appraisal ensures that deprivileged 
viewpoints and marginalized interests will continue to find 
their expression.
In the model of hermeneutic democracy, the two 
interrelated facets of democratic functioning are the two 
halves which make up the whole. Whereas the hermeneutic 
model is characterized by an ongoing cycle of immanent 
processes, communitarians and liberal individualists each
5portray a fragmented half, rendered inert as a result of 
having been disengaged from the other. The communitarian 
view of citizenship emphasizes the first half of the 
hermeneutic circle: shared understandings are the result of 
common community membership, and are the basis upon which 
citizens come together for public dialogue. Correspondingly, 
the liberal individualist view of citizenship stresses the 
second half of the hermeneutic circle: individual reflection 
provides citizens with the perspective whereby they may 
critique the premises of the political community and the 
appropriateness of its decisions.
The communitarian and liberal individualist models of 
citizenship include aspects of democracy. Yet, the 
communitarian insistence on the antecedence of the 
community, and the liberal individualist insistence on the 
antecedence of the individual, result in truncated models of 
the citizen, the community, and democratic processes. In 
liberal individualism and communitarianism, we find reified 
segments rather than functioning components of an animated 
whole. The model of citizenship grounded in hermeneutic 
democracy offers the means of analyzing the liberal 
individualist-communitarian debate in terms of the 
democratic processes which each perspective affirms.
However, the distinguishing feature of the hermeneutic model 
of citizenship is the absence of the constraints of 
antecedence: the identity of the hermeneutic self is neither
6fully individuated, nor entirely socially-constituted, but 
rather an integrated combination of communal and autonomous 
factors. Similarly, in the hermeneutic model, neither the 
individual nor the community is epistemologically 
antecedent.
As the theoretical point of reference for this essay, I 
suggest that Aristotle can be read as propounding the 
hermeneutic conception of democratic processes which I 
advance.1 At the most fundamental level, Aristotle's polity 
exhibits a moderated balance between concern for the 
individual and concern for the community. This aspect of 
hermeneutic democracy combined with the fact that essential 
characteristics of democracy appear in the communitarian and 
liberal individualist models, mean that an Aristotelian 
perspective provides not simply an alternative, but a middle 
ground. The identity of the self of the hermeneutic model is 
comprised of a combination of socially-contingent and 
autonomous qualities. Consequently, the hermeneutic model of 
the self as a citizen engaged in democratic processes avoids
1 Throughout this essay I comply with modern usage in using 
the term "democracy," as the equivalent of what Aristotle referred 
to as politeia. As we know, in Aristotle's six-cell matrix, 
democracy is actually the deviated form of politeia. In his words, 
"political control exercised by the mass of the populace in the 
common interest is politeia." Aristotle, The Politics. Penguin, 
1962; 1279a32. Politeia is the arrangement in which authority rests 
in the hands of the many and they wield it in the interest of the 
citizen body. Democracy is the deviation of polity in that it is 
characterized by the rule of "men without means," who do not "aim 
to be of profit to the common interest." Ibid., 1279b4. Please see 
in addition, Ibid., IV, ii, "Constitutions Placed in Order of 
Merit"; also, IV, iii, "Why There Are Several Constitutions."
7the constraints created by the dualism which is so pervasive 
in the debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians.
Because their fundamental visions of the self are so 
different, the majority of what we have witnessed up to this 
point in the debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians is two sides talking at each other. For the 
most part, meaningful exchange is deterred by a seeming lack 
of common ground. A conception of citizenship, drawing on 
the resources of hermeneutic democracy, provides a context 
for communication between communitarians and liberal 
individualists because it integrates the socially- 
constituted and individualistic aspects of the self in a 
manner which indicates that these two facets of an 
individual need not be mutually exclusive.
The moderating effects of hermeneutic processes as 
outlined in Aristotelian thought, affords an equilibrium 
between consideration of theory and practice and the 
individual and the community, making it possible to discuss 
theory and practice and the individual and the community 
without conflating them, or giving one half of either pair 
priority over the other. The contrast between this stance, 
on the one hand, and liberal individualism and 
communitarianism, on the other, is clear. The premises of 
liberal individualism constantly pull in the direction of 
the importance and options of the individual. In the same
8manner, the assumptions of communitarianism push this 
perspective toward an emphasis on the privileges and 
prerogatives of the community. f
The essential ingredient of hermeneutic democracy is 
public dialogue as the context for the exchange of ideas and 
decision-making. The first norm of democratic discourse is 
that neither perspectives nor potential solutions are 
rejected out of hand. This grounding is congruous with the 
principles of democracy, and with the corresponding 
hermeneutic epistemology. The consequence is a pragmatic 
conception of theory, and epistemological pluralism, meaning 
that the fairness of democratic discourse and the legitimacy 
of the decisions it yields are derived directly from its 
inclusiveness.
The relationships between liberal individualism and 
communitarianism, and the components of democratic 
functioning which they espouse, are not without problems.
For liberal individualists and communitarians, the central 
problems of citizenship are twofold, appearing at the level 
of the individual and of the polity. The liberal 
individualist anticipates voluntary citizen involvement in 
the forms of voting, citizen consent to the rule of law, and 
cooperation with institutionalized procedures in the event 
of conflicts of interest. The initial tension between 
liberal individualism and democracy is that the self who 
began life in the state of nature is inclined toward neither
9involvement nor compromise. Regarding the polity, the 
liberal individualist claim that its model of the self is 
universally applicable makes it extremely difficult for 
liberal individualists to defend restrictions on the 
accessibility of citizenship, since all individuals ought to 
enjoy comparable rights. Consequently, the question of who 
is entitled to the privileges of democratic citizenship, and 
on what bases, can only be resolved if the nation-state is 
accepted as a given, and is justified on pragmatic, rather 
than philosophical grounds. In short, the priority of the 
individual conjoined with the universality of liberal tenets 
and democratic mechanisms embedded in liberal political 
institutions, sets up the dissonance between the liberal 
individualist vision for unrestricted individual self- 
determination and the practical reality of the boundaries of 
the modern nation-state.
For communitarians, the initial problem of citizenship 
is that communitarianism portrays the self as a citizen 
unequipped to engage in individual deliberation, or to 
prioritize the demands of the multiple memberships 
characteristic of modern society. The tension between 
communitarian and democratic premises on the issue of 
citizenship is the proclivity for communitarians to 
emphasize the distinction between citizens and non-citizens 
as the justification for community boundaries. But from a 
democratic standpoint, distinctions made on the basis of
10
heredity are politically irrelevant because such attributes 
have negligible bearing on citizenship skills.
In communitarianism the individual citizen relates to 
the state through a particular sub-group— the community of 
origin as defined by some ascribed characteristic. The 
claims of this primary membership have the potential of 
placing the citizen at odds with the modern nation-state. By 
contrast, liberal individualists depict an individual 
citizen relating directly to the state without the buffering 
effects of intermediary organizations. The liberal 
individualist citizen is concerned with protecting his/her 
private life from state intrusion, because the private realm 
is the sphere of human fulfillment. In this schema, multiple 
political and social memberships have little effect on the 
relationship between this citizen and the state, or on the 
state itself.
Differing aspects of democracy are incorporated by 
communitarians and liberal individualists. Communitarian 
depictions of community discourse and communicative 
interaction suggest an openness of expression seemingly akin 
to democratic dialogue. However, the significant point for 
communitarians is that just as community is prior to the 
individual, shared understandings are antecedent to communal 
communication. Therefore, democracy in the context of 
communitarianism is reduced to discourse as a means of 
uncovering the pre-existent areas of general consensus and a
11
celebration of commonality. From a communitarian 
perspective, discourse in the community is not so much 
public as social, and as with shared understandings, the 
social precedes the political. Because affirmations of 
commonality are intrinsically fulfilling, allusions to 
democratic functioning become intertwined with the 
community's capacity to provide the good life.
To liberal individualists, democracy is a means of 
protecting individual citizens because the framework of 
democracy provides the matrix for the design of institutions 
which give citizens adequate control over the apparatus of 
the state. In addition, liberal individualists advocate 
democracy because it is thought to encourage civic spirit 
among individuals whose interests are fundamentally 
presocial and prepolitical. The paradox of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state for liberal democracy is 
that the state is the guarantor of personal liberty, but 
also has the propensity and means to intrude into the 
private lives and choices of citizens.
Because democracy is essential to the communitarian 
vision of the good life in the community, and to the well- 
ordered society of liberal individualists, we must ask how 
these two models would look if the elements of democracy 
they incorporate were removed. Without democracy, the polity 
created by communitarianism is vulnerable to collectivism, 
exclusivity, and internally-established requisites of
12
homogeneity as the basis for shared understandings. Without 
democracy, the polity created by liberal individualism is 
vulnerable to fragmentation, civic apathy, and antagonistic 
relations between citizens and between citizens and state, 
since the state is the most likely assailant of individual 
rights.
Without democracy, the non-elective aspects of a 
communitarian community become pivotal. Community membership 
is not determined volitionally but by birth, on the basis of 
hereditary characteristics. Moreover, communitarians have 
little to say about community leadership. We are left to 
wonder who becomes a leader and why. If ascribed attributes 
are the foundation of community, and democratic processes 
are not specified, the community may easily be brought under 
the influence of non-elected leaders because of their 
populistic charisma. More important, without an explicit 
inclusion of democracy there are no grounds for constraint 
on the non-democratic impulses of leaders.
The leap of faith made by communitarians is the premise 
that common inherited qualities will result in shared 
understandings. As a consequence, the discourse of 
communitarianism is not intended to facilitate collective 
deliberation or augmentation of understanding. The 
undemocratic propensities of communitarianism are rooted in 
the fallacies of this basic assumption. Although 
communitarians portray communities engaging in public
13
discourse, we find that the purpose of such activity is 
perpetuation of the community rather than the uncovering of 
citizens' opinions or joint reasoning.
Without democracy, liberal individualism devolves into 
atomistic anarchy. The liberal individualist emphasis on 
personal liberty combined with conceptualizing the private 
realm as the venue for fulfillment prompts recollection of 
the liberal adage th^t freedom starts where politics end. 
Without democratic institutions the liberal individualist 
self inclines back toward the state of nature. Without 
democratic procedures, amicable conflict resolution is 
likely to elude free individuals, each pursuing a personal 
conception of the good life.
In order to depict a well-ordered society, liberal 
individualists require not only political institutions, but 
that those institutions be democratic. Otherwise, citizens 
are not vested with the authority necessary to keep the 
apparatus of the state in check. In a liberal democracy the 
rule of law provides for diffusion of power and the 
accountability of leaders to the citizenry, and is therefore 
the appropriate mechanism of governmental restraint. 
Democracy must be the distinguishing feature of the polity 
of liberal individualism because without it individuals are 
hopelessly mired in contentious relations with each other 
and with the state.
The leap of faith among liberal individualists is from
14
the abstract construction of primordial man to the 
exigencies of dealing with actual citizens. The nameless, 
faceless individual in the state of nature, or behind the 
veil, is a utopian construct masquerading as a practical 
first order premise. For liberal individualism, democracy is 
the means of promoting not only civil society but civility. 
It is the explicit inclusion of democracy which makes 
movement from the theoretical to the practical possible 
because liberal individualists must have institutions 
capable of mediating between free and equal citizens, and 
must promote the activities associated with democracy in 
order to encourage associational relationships between 
citizens in their common interest.
By rejecting the inevitability of political conflict 
and choosing aspects of democracy for instrumental reasons, 
communitarians and liberal individualists miss its essence. 
Each perspective borrows facets of democracy in order to 
explicate the well-functioning polity. But because democracy 
is a means of fulfilling other objectives, the 
transformative potential of democracy for both individual 
citizens and the polity at large eludes them. Communitarians 
appear unaware of the possibility that democratic discourse 
is an avenue for the development of shared understandings 
which can in turn serve as the referents for practical 
policy decisions. Liberal individualists seem inattentive to 
the prospect that relations among citizens, and between
15
citizens and the state, could rise above the level of 
suspicious tolerance. Neither perspective articulates the 
likelihood that democratic discourse could constructively 
expand citizens* self-understanding and thereby increase the 
menu of options for personal and collective choices.
The hermeneutic model of democracy provides 
communitarians with a means of validating the differences, 
as evidenced in the diversity of ideas, within the citizen 
body. Hermeneutic democracy acknowledges the legitimacy of 
disparate, even conflicting viewpoints; it does not assume 
nor depend on intellectual and cultural homogeneity as the 
point of departure for discourse. The hermeneutic model of 
democracy provides liberal individualists an explanation for 
consensus which goes beyond the vagaries of a coincidental 
convergence of interests. Hermeneutic democracy builds the 
foundation of consensus upon public discourse, and 
incorporates norms which nurture mutual respect and 
persuasibility. The hermeneutic model regards democracy as 
both a means and an end. We shall see that as a means, 
hermeneutic democracy formulates distinctive expectations of 
what can be accomplished through public discourse. As an 
end, hermeneutic democracy offers individual citizens a 
venue of fulfillment through active involvement in 
collective decisions.
Hermeneutic democracy builds a common area for 
communication between liberal individualists and
16
communitarians on the issue of citizenship because it takes 
an integrative and accommodative approach to 
conceptualization of the self and of the polity. A central 
aim of communitarians is the strengthening and perpetuation 
of the bonds of community. An important objective of liberal 
individualists is safeguarding the personal liberty and 
autonomy of individual citizens. The tenets and processes 
which comprise the hermeneutic circle of democratic 
functioning offer to communitarians and liberal 
individualists the means of moderating intractable premises 
regarding the self which constrain their perspectives, while 
enhancing the democratic facets of citizen activity evident 
in each of the models. In so doing, hermeneutic democracy 
provides a theory of citizenship which stands out as a 
balanced and conciliatory third alternative in the debate 
between liberal individualists and communitarians.
The first portion of this essay focuses on 
communitarian conceptions of the self, the citizen, and the 
political community. The second section is devoted to 
liberal individualist perspectives on these points. The 
third part of this essay grounds the model of hermeneutic 
democracy in the Aristotelian perspective on the self, the 
activities associated with citizenship, and the dynamic 
processes which comprise the hermeneutic circle. Within this 
context, the conclusion attempts to contribute to our 
understanding of the viewpoints of liberal individualists
17
and communitarians regarding the constitution of the self, 
and the ramifications of prioritizing either the individual 
or the community. Finally, the conclusion draws out 
implications of how a hermeneutic approach revitalizes our 
perceptions of democratic citizenship by conceptualizing 
democracy as an animated circle of hermeneutic processes.
Chapter I:
The Self and Citizen of Communitarianism
The History of Conceptions of the Communitarian Self
The communitarian authors cited in this essay are 
unanimous in depicting the impact of community on individual 
citizens to be positive. But explaining the reasons for this 
requires more than the premises that living in communities 
is a natural state of affairs and that humans are products 
of their environments. These tenets alone can account only 
for a passive and benign view of community, one which would 
not be capable of differentiating itself from liberal 
individualism, since even liberal individualists are 
products of liberal communities. Liberal individualism 
reflects a spectrum of viewpoints, and similarly, 
communitarianism is a melange of opinions. We will address 
the fundamental issue of citizenship by analyzing three 
historical exemplars, and by asking what it means to be a 
member of a community, and why this membership is both 
constitutive and beneficial.
What is assumed but not articulated by the historical 
and contemporary communitarian authors cited here is 
democratic interaction between individuals and the 
community. Moreover, interaction informed by democratic
18
19
principles is the condition which ensures that this 
interchange will be positive and constructive. The facet of 
hermeneutic democracy which makes the relationship amicable, 
as well as advantageous to members, is the capacity for 
members to utilize shared understandings as a foundation 
from which to establish consensus on day-to-day questions.
In other words, communitarian depictions of communal 
functioning exemplify the first phase of the hermeneutic 
circle.
Communitarians presuppose the existence of shared 
understandings and common interests ? to be a member of a 
community is to subscribe to particular values and 
viewpoints. On this basis, the function of discourse within 
the community is to build on the pre-existent foundation of 
commonality in order to uncover communal inclinations on 
issues at hand. This leads us to several implications of the 
emphasis on community and the socially-constituted self 
found in the communitarian vision of democracy and 
citizenship.
The first is a truncated account of democratic 
discourse and processes since the assumption of shared 
understandings indicates that arriving at consensus is a 
fairly straightforward task. By contrast to the hermeneutic 
model, public discourse in the communitarian schema uncovers 
the consensus which already exists because of shared 
understandings. In the hermeneutic model of democracy,
20
public discourse precedes and is a means of establishing 
consensus. Second, because arriving at agreement is expected 
to be unproblematic, there is little need for persuasion. 
Third, the communitarian model of citizenship is void of 
mechanisms that would encourage the incorporation of 
differing and dissenting viewpoints, and of incentives to 
question the validity of fundamental communal perspectives 
or their practical applications. In short, the second 
portion of the hermeneutical circle is missing. For these 
reasons, the communitarian renderings of democracy and 
citizenship fail to articulate the means whereby the 
community can gain deliberative perspective by which to 
appraise itself. The bonds of tradition become bondage to 
precedent since only half of the hermeneutic cycle of the 
democratic process can function without the means for 
critical self-evaluation.
A factor which contributes significantly to ambiguities 
and misunderstandings in the debate between liberal 
individualists and communitarians is that the term 
"community," as used by communitarians, has two broad 
categories of meanings. The connotations of these two 
groupings can be differentiated by asking whether the term 
is used to endorse recognition of the ubiquitous influence 
of communities in contributing to the identity and 
perceptions of individuals, or whether community positively 
impacts its members and is therefore associated with the
21
good life. In the latter case, communitarians rely on the 
inclusion of democracy to explain the advantages of 
community. The second definition of community involves a 
specific type of political functioning, that is, democracy, 
and carries normative implications since it makes democracy 
the standard for political processes.
The tradition of communitarianism reflects a range of 
perspectives regarding the constitution of the self and the 
importance of community. In examining the facets of 
contemporary communitarianism pertinent to the issue of 
citizenship, the impact of several strands of historical 
thought is evident. For our purposes, three will be 
considered. First is the unified community created by the 
General Will of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Second is community 
based on tradition as an accumulation of evolutionary 
development, portrayed by Edmund Burke. Third, is community 
as the essential element of the human experience because it 
provides the framework for interaction. Without interaction 
even self-awareness is impossible. This strand of 
communitarian thought is found in the work of Georg Hegel. 
Each of these perspectives have remained significant and are 
evident in contemporary communitarianism. Each reflects a 
particular emphasis on the nature and role of the political 
community, and consequently, what it means to be a citizen.
These three are chosen from the canon of secular 
communitarianism because they articulate facets of
22
communitarian thought which remain influential. Jean Jacques 
Rousseau's conception of the General Will furnishes an ideal 
of the potential for solidarity and unity of interest in a 
political community. The impact of Rousseau is evident in 
the thought of Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre, among 
others. Edmund Burke depicts socially-constructed 
individuals as citizens of communities where tradition and 
precedent are the optimal guides for wise opinions and 
actions. The perspectives of Alisdair MacIntyre and Michael 
Sandel similarly reflect a fundamental conservatism rooted 
in the value of the traditions and histories of particular
communities. The model of the self which serves as the
foundation of Hegel's philosophy remains important to 
communitarianism because it provides an alternative to the 
self of liberal individualism. For Hegel and Burke, it is a 
fallacy to conceptualize a human in isolation from others. 
The influence of Hegel is explicitly evident in the thought 
of Charles Taylor, and adherence to analogous models of the 
self are apparent in the work of Michael Walzer and Michael 
Sandel.
Rousseau's explication of the General Will requires, as
a framework, a cohesive community. The "social pact,"
comparable to Locke's contract, transposes the individual 
from the state of nature into civil society. By contrast 
however, Rousseau's citizen does not enter the political 
community as a person with property holdings and assorted
23
private interests. Rather, "every individual gives himself
absolutely" in order to form a unified whole:
Each one of us puts into the community his person 
and all his powers under the supreme direction of 
the general will; and as a body, we incorporate 
every member as an indivisible part of the 
whole.2
The citizen depicted by Rousseau gains much by moving 
from life as an individual in the state of nature to life as 
a member of the political community. Indeed, he/she is 
transformed from an "stupid, limited animal" into an 
"intelligent" citizen.3 In citing the ramifications of this 
metamorphosis Rousseau exalts both the community and the 
political. The parameters of the political and public realms 
are circumscribed so broadly that the private realm is all 
but obliterated. From the standpoints of citizenship and 
community, the General Will as an abstract conception enjoys 
wide appeal; one reason is that it offers an ideal of a
2 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (London: 
Penguin, 1968), 61. Via the General Will, the interests of the 
political community are singularized into one collective interest. 
The General Will interprets this interest and administers all 
decisions related to its execution. The decisions made by the 
General Will "will always be good." Ibid., 73. Consequently, 
adherence to the General Will as the referent yields infallible 
direction, and resisting it is synonymous with removing oneself 
from the community.The reductio ad absurdum of the General Will is 
authoritarian totalitarianism since evidences of individuality, 
much less dissent, are taken as threats to the political community, 
"Nothing is more dangerous in public affairs than the influence of 
private interests." Ibid., 112.
3 Ibid., 65. Please see also Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse 
on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality," in The First and 
Second Discourses. (New York: St. Martinfs Press, 1964), 115-16 and 
139-141.
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unified community in which the diverse inclinations of
citizens are merged into one interest.
In Edmund Burke we have an excellent exemplar of a
perspective founded on the socially-constituted self and
conservative communitarianism. For Burke, the community of
origin is the primary determinant of an individual1s
fundamental perspectives. Burkean communitarianism is not so
much a study in the politics of identity as an exposition of
the origins of reasonable opinions. This is indicated
throughout the Reflections on the Revolution in France:
"...[B]eing a citizen of a particular state is being bound
up in a considerable degree by its public will...."4 Along
with this, Burke illustrates the epistemological
particularism which has become a pillar of communitarian
thought: Any form of political arrangement may only be
evaluated in the context of its unique circumstances,
Circumstances give in reality to every political 
principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating 
effect. The circumstances are what render every civil 
and political scheme beneficial or noxious to 
mankind.5
For Burke, the value of the political community is its 
capacity to provide the context for its citizens to 
collectively rise above mere life, and to partake of the 
good life,
4 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
(London: Penguin, 1986), 88.
5 Ibid., 90.
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11 [The state] is to be looked on with other 
reverence; because it is not a partnership in 
things subservient only to the gross animal 
existence of a temporary and perishable nature."6
The body of citizens is the foundation of consensus, in that 
it is the base of support for the political system.7 The 
citizens of this political community participate primarily 
by showing proper reverence for their state. Moreover, the 
state is an accretion of tradition whose merit rests on its 
capacity to reflect evolutionary progress in the accumulated 
wisdom of forbearers.
Accordingly, citizens are socially-constituted persons 
in the sense that knowledge of self is formed relative to 
other members of the community, both in the present and the 
past. From this premise follows Burke's belief that a well- 
organized community is capable of producing good citizens.8
6 Ibid., 194. Because of their membership, citizens of every 
era are like the links of a chain which extends into the past and 
into the future, [The state] "becomes a partnership not only 
between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Ibid., 194. 
Citizenship furnishes the individual with both a temporal identity 
and the possibility of immortality by providing a connection with 
the past and the future.
7 However, the making of political decisions is to be 
undertaken by those with technical expertise and suitable 
character, "A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, 
taken together, would be my standard of a statesman." Ibid., 2 67.
8 As we are well aware, in Reflections on the French 
Revolution, this cuts both ways. Burke's affirmation of British 
political and civil society is contrasted with alarm over 
repercussions of the revolution in France. Burke takes care to 
demonstrate that his preference of the British political system is 
based on sound judgement rather than unreasoned allegiance.
26
The organization and structure of community are variables in 
the communally-determined identity of the Burkean self since 
individuals have identities as commoners, aristocrats, and 
so on. In Britain, which is Burke's ideal community, the 
estates as sub-communities are entirely harmonious with, and 
indeed reinforce, the super-community of the state.
In juxtaposing the British political system with the 
French Revolutionary government, Burke develops a meticulous 
defense of tradition as a guide, when it is tempered with 
provisions for incremental change.9 The new community 
created by the French revolutionaries is an effort to sweep 
away everything associated with the ancien regime. To Burke, 
this is preposterous because in so doing the French have cut 
themselves off from the only possible source of practical 
and applicable knowledge.10 As the outcome, Burke 
anticipates a community of rootless and fatuous citizens 
lacking direction, with the potential to become an
9 "A state without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation." Burke cites Britain's combination of 
statutory and common law as the means of gradual and evolutionary 
transformation. By contrast, the leaders of the French Revolution 
have attempted to sweep away all that was associated with civil and 
political society under the Bourbons. Burke warns, "But power, of 
some kind or other, will survive the shock in which manners and 
opinions perish; and it will find other and worse means for its 
support." Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France. 
(London: Penguin, 1986), 106 and 172.
10 "In history a great volume is unrolled for our instruction, 




Hegel uses the language of metaphysics to render the
socially-constructed self. For Hegel, understanding of
humans is sought on a collective basis, by identifying the
Spirit, (alternatively translated as Mind or Reason), of a
given community during a particular era. The inception and
character of a community's Spirit is traced back to the
elemental interaction between individuals.12 Interaction as
a requisite of self-consciousness and community is the
foundation of the socially-constituted self.
The chief characteristic of the citizen is his/her
interconnectedness to all other members of the community.
Thus, the political community is depicted as a network,
There is formed a system of complete 
interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness 
and legal status of one man is interwoven with 
the livelihood, happiness and rights of all. On 
this system, individual happiness, etc., depend, 
and only in this connected system are they 
actualized and secured.13
The claim made here is fundamental to communitarianism: The
11 "I cannot conceive how any man can have brought himself to 
that pitch of presumption to consider his country as nothing but 
carte blanche, upon which he may scribble whatever he pleases." 
Ibid., 266.
12 "For ethical life is nothing other than the absolute 
spiritual unity of the essence of individuals...." Georg F. W. 
Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 174. "At first this active reason 
is conscious of itself only as an individual, and as such must 
demand and bring forth its actuality in another." Ibid., 175. 
"Consciousness of an other...is indeed itself necessarily self- 
consciousness...." Ibid., 211.
13 Georg Hegel, "Philosophy of Right," in Political Writings. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 64), 12 0.
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community is a prerequisite of human fulfillment. As we 
shall see, this is frequently the basis upon which community 
is elevated to the stature it enjoys in communitarianism.
The political community is far more than a pragmatic 
response to the difficulties encountered by individuals in 
the state of nature. The community may be an efficient means 
by which to provide for the necessities of life, but of far 
greater significance, the community is the means of living 
the good life.
The self whose identity is socially-constituted 
combined with the notion of community as the venue for human 
fulfillment means that the ideal citizen is one who lives in 
harmony with community norms. Hegel maintains that this 
insight has classical roots, "The wisest among the ancients 
declared that wisdom and virtue consist in living in 
accordance with the customs of one's own people."14 This 
bears obvious resemblance to Burke. The actualization of 
self occurs in the context of the community and in a 
cultivated consonance between the individual and the 
standards of the group. The possibility of individual self­
development, in a context separate from the community, is 
implicitly dismissed by Burke and Hegel and explicitly 
discouraged by Rousseau.
14 Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1910), 223.
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The Communitarian Self as the Prototype for the Citizen 
The common foundation of contemporary secular 
communitarianism is the socially-constructed self grounded 
in a particularistic and constructivist epistemology. The 
communitarian claim that human identity is socially- 
constituted raises the question of how communities 
contribute to individual development and identity. Although 
this leaves room for variance, communities are generally 
distinguished by some shared understanding. The organizing 
principle of a community is a basic commonality such as 
culture, religion, or a physical attribute like ethnicity. 
Moreover, communities whose shared understandings are 
founded in cultural, religious or ethnic commonality develop 
agendas which include political goals. For this reason, the 
part played by the propensity for humans to group themselves 
according to culture, religion and ethnicity is viewed here 
in the context of collective political relations, or, in 
terms of the public and political interests of 
communities.15
15 To avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that 
communitarians vary the vocabulary used when referring to what is 
commonly held to be community. Charles Taylor frequently uses the 
term "culture.11 Michael Sandel refers to community commonalities in 
terms of "shared history," although he also articulates a number of 
practical forms which communities make take. Please see Michael J. 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 31. Alisdair 
MacIntyre most commonly refers to communities as "traditions." 
Please see After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. 
Robert Bellah and the authors of Habits of the Heart refer to the 
benefits of communitarian thinking in sociological terms, such as 
"shared conceptions of the common good," "social ecology," and 
"common dialogue," as well as using traditional terms to identify
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Fundamental to communitarian thought is the premise 
that there are multiple societal and communal factors which 
contribute to the identity, personality and self- 
understanding of each human being.16 Acknowledging the 
influence of the communities of which we are a part, is not 
merely a theoretical technique used to establish first order 
principles. Rather, communitarians associate this 
acknowledgement with cognizance of what determines the 
evolution of the framework and reference points of self- 
understanding. Moreover, it is on this basis that 
communitarianism claims a valid representation of the nature 
of humans and associative relationships, and therefore, its 
philosophical authority and applicability.
Community as the context of accumulated wisdom which 
operates through the network of social and political 
relationships is a feature evident in the thought of Edmund 
Burke and Michael Sandel. For Burke and Sandel, the 
individual is socially-constituted in the sense that 
community is the framework for all strata of human
recognizable communities such as family, religious, civic and 
political communities. Michael Walzer forthrightly refers to 
communities, almost invariably using that term itself rather than 
synonyms. Please see Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," and 
"Membership," in Spheres of Justice.
16 Please see Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self Chapters 
1 and 4; also, "...[T]he free individual of the West is only what 
he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought 
him to be and which nourishes him....I doubt whether we could 
maintain our sense of ourselves as autonomous beings...." Charles 
Taylor, "Atomism," Philosophy and the Human Sciences. 206.
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understanding— from self-awareness to a world view. The 
perspective of Sandel also resonates with Hegel regarding 
the integral role of human interaction. The views of Hegel 
and Sandel on this point suggest that construction of an 
isolated individual, or an unencumbered self, is merely a 
chimera.
As articulated by Michael Sandel, a communitarian self-
understanding involves awareness that there are
circumstantial and environmental factors which profoundly
impact the formation and composition of the self:
For to have character is to know that I move in a 
history I neither summon nor command, which 
carries consequences none the less for my choices 
and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more
distant from others; it makes some aims more
appropriate, others less so. As a self 
interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my 
history and in this sense to distance myself from 
it, but the distance is always precarious and 
provisional, the point of reflection never finally 
secured outside the history itself. A person with 
character thus knows that he is implicated in 
various ways even as he reflects, and feels the
moral weight of what he knows.17
This conveys the dynamics of the internal workings of the
individual, and indicates the centrality of community by
suggesting that the beliefs derived from commonality with
other members of the community are the referent for the
internal politics of the self. It is worth noting that
communal identities are not an overlay added to a "real,"
essential, or primitive self. A socially-constituted self is
17 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 179.
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the real and essential self.
For Alisdair MacIntyre, attempting to ignore the debt
to tradition, is to cut oneself off from the source of
rational evaluation and moral reasoning,
The person outside all traditions lacks sufficient 
rational resources for enquiry and...has no 
adequate relevant means of rational evaluation and 
hence can come to no well grounded conclusion, 
including the conclusion that no tradition can 
vindicate itself against any other. To be outside 
all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry; it 
is to be in a state of intellectual and moral 
destitution....18
The self without the community as a framework for ethical
understanding is an alienated and arational being. In a
manner similar to that outlined by Sandel, communal shared
understandings are the beacons which guide personal
reflection. Once again it becomes clear that the socially-
constituted self is not merely intended as an abstract
construct, but as an immanently applicable model.
Accordingly, we find in communitarian thought articulation
of the inverse: the morally self sufficient and autonomous
individual is a delusion. For MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel and
Bellah, the self which serves as the cornerstone of liberal
individualism is pointless as a philosophical starting point
18 Alisdair MacIntyre. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 367. It should 
be noted that for MacIntyre, "enquiry11 describes moral reasoning. 
Please see "Rival Justices, Competing Rationalities," in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?.
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because it is a fallacy.19
With Jean Jacques Rousseau, Alisdair MacIntyre shares 
an emphasis on the unity of interests within a community, 
and the morality of shared understandings. In both cases, 
the legitimacy of community decisions is derived from 
agreement on a fundamental slate of social goods.
MacIntyre's reliance on traditions of moral enquiry as the 
grounding for community values also bears some similarity to 
Edmund Burke's emphasis on history and precedent. However, 
for MacIntyre the importance of history lies in the 
evolution of the prioritization of virtues20, whereas for 
Burke, the British model of community decision-making is 
validated on the basis of the admirable national community 
which Britain has become.
MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Walzer, Bellah and co­
authors seek to add a dimension to human understanding in 
explicating how collective, community-based factors effect 
self-understanding, and foundational social and political
19 Please see Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. Chapters 5, 6, 
9 and 18, and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. Chapter 17? 
Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self, and "Atomism," in 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences. 187 210; Michael Sandel, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Part I; Robert Bellah, et 
al., Habits of the Heart.
20 MacIntyre criticizes "liberal individualism" inter alia 
because it "illegitimately ignores the inescapably historically and 
socially context-bound character which any substantive set of 
principles of rationality, whether theoretical or practical, is 
bound to have." Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which 
Rationality? (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 4.
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concepts.21 Furthermore, it is implicit that the impact of 
community is positive. The benefit of community for a 
socially-constituted self is a foundation and context for 
shared understanding which affords to members a stable 
referent upon which to build one’s personal identity. The 
communitarians cited have an assortment of reasons for their 
emphasis on community. These reasons provide insight into 
the degree to which the community is emphasized relative to
21 The grouping and categorization of persons necessarily 
involves some oversimplification. In the case of Michael Walzer 
this is particularly evident because his thought combines 
fundamental liberal (although not atomistic) premises, with strong 
advocacy of the benefits of community. Walzer's chapter on 
"Membership" in Spheres of Justice is an appropriate case in point. 
Walzer exhibits a fundamental concern is for the physical security 
and protection of the rights of individuals as autonomous moral 
beings, "Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger." In 
addition, Walzer is interested in the just distribution of a social 
good, "The primary good that we distribute to one another is 
membership...." But this is combined with the particularistic and 
constructivist epistemology of immanent critique, more in line with 
communitarianism, "Membership as a social good is constituted by 
our understanding; its value is fixed by our work and 
conversation...." Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 31-32. It would perhaps be most apt to 
refer to Walzer as a liberal communitarian. Michael Walzer does not 
develop a typically communitarian version of the self, in the sense 
of a socially-constituted self. However, in Spheres of Justice 
Walzer launches an argument which is "radically particularistic," 
and in which social justice is understood exclusively within the 
context of communal frameworks. Community membership is clearly the 
most valued social good, and the explication of the spheres of 
justice strongly suggests multiple communities as the spheres for 
distribution. Please see also, Michael Walzer, "Citizenship," in 
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, "Philosophy and 
Democracy," Political Theory 9 (1981), "The Communitarian Critique 
of Liberalism,11 Political Theory 18 (1990), and "The Civil Society 




The Communitarian Conception of Citizenship
To communitarians, communities are the entities which 
provide citizens with the context for forming and acting on 
collectively determined concepts of the good. The content 
and focus of citizens' concepts of the good are inherently 
social. For Charles Taylor, citizenship is a derivation of 
the individual's membership in their community of origin. 
Because the socially-constructed self is the only reasonable 
description of a human being, the self in the context of 
his/her community is the model of the citizen. This 
conception of citizenship is founded on a particular 
understanding of the good, since "the nature of the good 
requires that it be sought in common."23
22 Over the centuries, communitarians have described and 
prescribed many types of communities. However, the topics at hand 
are political communitarianism and citizenship. In this context, 
one additional essential of communitarianism should be mentioned: 
the absence of a state/society distinction. The state/society 
distinction occasionally appears in theological communitarianism. 
However, the communitarian authors cited in this essay define 
"political" broadly, are concerned with secular political 
communities, and view the community in extensive and inclusive 
terms which obviates the purpose of a distinction between the 
state, (understood as the political community), and society.
23 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in 
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann 
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
59. Consequently, Taylor explains the importance of collective 
self-understanding and the genesis of the self/other distinction 
within the framework of citizenship, "On their [Quebeckers] view, 
a society can be organized around a definition of the good life, 
without this being seen as a depreciation of those who do not 
personally share this definition." Ibid., 59.
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Taylor adopts what is perhaps the most foundationalist 
perspective on this point by associating ontology with 
explanations of associative relationships. "Ontological 
questions concern what you recognize as the factors you will 
invoke to account for social life."24 If explanations of 
associative relationships are ontology, the basic 
understanding of community becomes the venue in which 
ontological issues are played out. Taylor*s conceptions of 
community and the self are theoretically holistic and 
organic as opposed to atomistic and metaphysical. 
Correspondingly, practical recommendations on communities, 
understood as subgroups of nations, reflect a holistic 
approach by upholding the value of the parameters of 
communities, since these lines of demarcation permit the 
maintenance of each community's distinctive features.25
24 Charles Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian 
Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 159.
25 The need to preserve the distinguishing features of 
communities is a matter of the utmost importance, because it can 
mean the difference between survival and extinction. The 
substructure of Taylor's communitarian citizenship is ontological 
if one accepts the definition of ontology as factors that explain 
the inception of society. This is characteristically communitarian 
since it is grounded in the conviction that individuals are 
socially-constituted. Although Taylor cites examples of historical 
and contemporary communities, the central case in point is his 
community of origin, the Quebeckers of Canada. The distinguishing 
features of Quebeckers are cultural and linguistic. The political 
goals which Taylor advises for the Quebeckers focus on these two 
facets of the community's uniqueness. Charles Taylor, "The Politics 
of Recognition," in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of 
Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann and Charles Taylor (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 53-55. Taylor's advocacy of this 
agenda assumes that Quebeckers possess more than one membership
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The influence of Georg Hegel in the work of Charles 
Taylor is evident in the integral place of human interaction 
for all understanding including self-awareness, and the 
resultant ontological conception of human relations. Hegel 
observes that the objects of our consciousness can only find 
their "essential reality in another."26 In similar fashion, 
Taylor asserts: "I doubt whether we could maintain our sense 
of ourselves as autonomous beings."27
In the case of Alisdair MacIntyre, citizenship remains 
largely in the realm of theory and is tied to practice via 
concerns regarding the potential impact of public ethics and 
morality on policy. MacIntyre's central concern is moral 
decline. The dilemma is, "We have very largely, if not 
entirely lost our comprehension, both theoretical and
identity. Quebeckers are citizens of Quebec, a province with a 
separate cultural and linguistic heritage, as well as citizens of 
Canada. For Taylor, this is not intrinsically problematic because 
individuals are assumed to simultaneously hold membership in 
several communities, and be capable of having the appropriate 
loyalty to each. Taylor responds to allegations of ethnocentrism by 
pointing to the republican premise which is the foundation of 
Canada's governance, "participation in self rule is the essence of 
freedom, and part of what must be secured." Please see Charles 
Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate," in
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 179.
26 Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, Ltd., 1910), 174.
27 Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2 06. 
The impact of Hegel on Taylor can be observed also in Taylor's 
theory of social action. On this point, please see Charles Taylor, 
"Social Theory and Practice," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1989) .
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practical, of morality."28 Rather than a coherent and 
applicable morality, we possess only the "fragments of a 
conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from 
which their significance derived."29 Implicit in this 
critique is that the shared understandings and moral 
resources available through communities provide, inter alia, 
a common language capable of serving as the medium of 
communication. This is evidenced in MacIntyre*s depiction of 
his project,
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in 
the actual world which we inhabit the language of 
morality is in a...state of grave disorder....30
The problem has been identified, and requirements of a
solution are clear: A framework must be found which is
capable of providing a coherent context for the language and
understanding of morality. Communities, or "traditions,1' are
the answer to this quest.31
28 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1981), 2.
29 Ibid. , 2 .
30 Ibid. , 2.
31 The archetypical community for MacIntyre is the Athenian 
polis, and Aristotelian thought is the corresponding zenith of 
philosophical achievement. The crucial characteristics of the polis 
are an esteem for virtue, and the guiding influence of the concept 
of telos. The impact of telos for community life is its capacity to 
provide a context for the self in which modes of judgement and 
action can be chosen. With this foundation, citizens are in a 
position to evaluate and prioritize virtues. This evaluation then 
becomes the reference point for all community decision-making and 
policy. In this way, the polis is the community which best provides 
the context for the "language of morality." On the effects of the 
absence of teleological thinking for both individuals and
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The views of citizenship and community found in 
MacIntyre reflect the particularism characteristic of 
communitarian thought. However, MacIntyre understands and 
applies this somewhat differently than Taylor. Where Taylor 
is concerned with the difficulty of making external 
judgments across communities and cultures, MacIntyre 
emphasizes that values form only within specific 
communities. This epistemology is particularistic in 
observing that the content and relative priority of values 
can only be internally established, and are therefore only 
relevant and applicable within the community of origin.
The problem of noncommensurability is encountered by 
both Taylor and MacIntyre. Taylor's concern is with pitfalls 
in the making of exogenous judgments which could be applied 
across communities. For MacIntyre, the quandary is how a 
community can prioritize a slate of goods when there is no 
manifest way to establish a standard by which to judge them 
all.32 This point is crucial to the highly-obscured, but 
significant place of democracy in MacIntyre's schema. What
communities: "The self is now thought of as lacking any necessary 
social identity, because the kind of social identity that it once 
enjoyed is no longer available; the self is now thought of as 
criterionless, because the kind of telos in terms of which it once 
judged and acted is not longer thought to be credible." Ibid., 32.
32 MacIntyre opens this discussion with a reference to the 
following: "... [E]very action and choice seem to aim at some good; 
the good, therefore, has been well defined as that at which all 
things aim. But it is clear that there is a difference in the ends 
at which they aim; in come cases activity is the end, in others the 
end is some product beyond the activity." Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics, I, 1094a.
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results from a communityfs need to prioritize various goods, 
is community as the context for "dialectical reasoning."33 
This alludes to the communitarian version of democracy and 
illustrates the operation of the first portion of the circle 
of hermeneutic processes: the community utilizes discourse 
grounded in shared understandings as the means of weighting 
social goods, especially, (for MacIntyre), in the form of 
virtues. There are two points worthy of note here. First, 
the ranking of goods is the most essential function of 
communities. Second, this ranking is carried out through 
dialectical processes within the community. Consequently, 
public discourse is a necessity. However, beyond the 
endorsement of "dialectical reasoning," neither 
participatory citizenship nor democratic processes are 
articulated.34
The ordering of goods and virtues within specific 
communities is the sine crua non of the logic behind a 
particularistic epistemology. At the same time, MacIntyre 
usefully illustrates a communitarian distinction between 
particularism and relativism. On one hand, the value placed
33 Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 133.
34 "From within and only from within a given polis, [citizens 
are] already provided with an ordering of goods, goods to be 
achieved by excellence within specific and systematic forms of 
activity, integrated irito an overall rank order by the political 
activity of particular citizens...." Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1988), 133.
41
on goods and virtues is particular to specific communities.
On the other hand, within their domain, (that is, each
community), the ranking of goods and values constitutes a
hierarchy. "Dialectical reasoning," is the,
condition of asking and answering questions about 
the arche of practical rationality that one is 
already a participant within a form of community 
which presupposes that there is a supreme, albeit 
perhaps complex, human good.35
The gradation of goods and virtues is based on community
acknowledgment of a "supreme" good, so the ordering produced
is hierarchical and community-specific, but not
relativistic.
In the thought of Michael Sandel, understanding the
importance of community in the development of personality is
a philosophically logical means of understanding the human
experience, because people are ineluctably influenced by
communities. Therefore, comprehending modes of rationality
is best pursued by observing humans as moral agents, but
within the context of communities. Community is not simply a
different format from which to ground theory. Theory is a
priori to community, and to all other experience because all
action reflects some theoretical stance,
...[P]hilosophy inhabits the world from the start; 
our practices and institutions are embodiments of 
theory. To engage in political practice is already 
to stand in relation to theory. 6
35 Ibid., 134.
36 Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the 
Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (February 1984), 81.
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MacIntyre and Taylor espouse a similar view with the 
proposition that theory is apparent in the "practices11 of 
individuals and communities.37
The view that theory is prior to action is a 
significant component of the thought of Sandel, MacIntyre 
and Taylor. A primary implication of this premise is that 
the tangible practices of community life give insight into 
underlying theory. Shared understandings become, in a sense, 
the theory which precedes practice and communities1 
practices reveal theory. The antecedence of shared 
understandings as the theory which informs public discourse 
yields a model of community practices which illustrates the 
limitation of democratic functions to the first portion of 
the circle of hermeneutic democracy. In communitarianism, 
associative relationships and collective deliberation within 
a community comprise the context of both theory and 
practice. Theory is developed in the community as a by­
product of the collectivity acting on its conception of the 
good. It is therefore not necessary for theory to be spelled 
out in order to serve as a guide for action.
37 mpher-e ought not to be two histories, one of political and 
moral action and one of political and moral theorizing, because 
there were not two pasts, one populated by actions, the other only 
by theories. Every action is the bearer and expression of more or 
less theory laden beliefs and concepts? every piece of theorizing 
and every expression of belief is a political and moral action." 
Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 58. Please see the conception of 
"practice" in Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 175-82; also 
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of 
Metaphysics 25, (1971):3-51.
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For Sandel, unlike MacIntyre, community, is not the 
response to a quest for coherent morality. Communities do 
provide the framework for collective reflection regarding 
values and goals; more importantly, communities are where we 
live, where we are coming from— whether we realize it, or 
admit it, or not.38 Democracy within the self and within 
the community are implied by Sandel as follows:
"intersubjective" and "intrasubjective" describe the 
dialogue which takes place on both levels. The self, (i.e. 
the individual citizen) is the context of intrasubjective 
discourse, while the community is the context of 
intersubjective discourse between citizens.39 Both the 
individual and the community are aware of and attentive to 
diverse internal voices.
Sandel does not argue for the founding or 
revitalization of communities, but for recognition of the 
impact of communities and the benefits of this impact.
38 The most basic community is the family, the most 
sophisticated is the nation, and between these two strata lie many 
intermediate human associations. Possible intermediate associations 
include, "tribes, neighbourhoods, cities, towns, universities, 
trade unions, national liberation movements and established 
nationalisms, and ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
communities." Please see Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
31.
39 "Intrasubjective conceptions...allow for...a plurality of 
selves within a single, individual human being, as when we account 
for inner deliberation in terms of the pull of competing 
identities...." Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice, 63. Similarly, " intersub jective conceptions. .. embrace more 
than a single, individual human being...." Ibid., 62-63.
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Regarding citizenship, this amounts to the recommendation 
that citizens relinquish atomistically oriented self- 
understandings in favor of a view in which the self is a 
component of a whole, where the whole is a community.
Michael Walzer approaches the topic of community by 
asking, "what is the preferred setting, the most supportive 
environment, for the good life?"40 That the response will 
be a social and collective setting is implicit in the 
framing of the question. In Spheres of Justice. Walzer 
proposes a system of complex equality based on the seriation 
of goods corresponding to spheres of human activity. The 
project is to provide an outline for the just distribution 
of important goods in a manner which will not be determined 
by the utility maximization and rational choice associated 
with market forces and economics. The argument for complex 
equality is launched in the context of politics because,
"the political community is probably the closest we can come 
to a world of common meanings."41 Democracy is suggested at
40 Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions 
of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992): 90. 
Walzer's text, Spheres of Justice has prompted use of the phrase, 
"liberal communitarianism.11 The essay, "The Civil Society 
Argument," goes beyond the book in advocating a more complex and 
pluralistic account of community activity, described in terms of 
"civil society."
41 Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," Spheres of Justice. (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), 28. Membership in the political
community is the most important good, and therefore the first to be 
considered. Walzer explicates the importance of political 
membership in terms of both internal and external considerations. 
For those inside the political community it is the first sphere of 
shared understandings and "common meanings." By contrast, being
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this point because the distribution of political membership
is to be determined by and within the community,
The community itself is a good, conceivably the 
most important good that gets distributed. But it 
is a good that can only be distributed by taking 
people in....membership cannot be handed out by 
some external agency; its value depends on an 
internal decision.42
The significant points of Walzer's conception of citizenship
are that community is the legitimate venue for decision
making, and the community provides a context of basic
consensus which facilitates collective decisions. One of the
most important responsibilities of a citizen is to help
decide the bases on which the rights of citizenship should
be allocated. Walzer indicates that this is best
accomplished through democratic processes.43
outside is perilous since, 1 [S]tatelessness is a condition of 
infinite danger." Michael Walzer, "Membership,11 in Ibid., 32.
42 Michael Walzer, "Complex Equality," in Ibid., 29.
43 A less obvious point regarding Walzer, but one which is 
pertinent to classifying him as a communitarian, is the methodology 
he advocates for the formulation of political theory. "The Civil 
Society Argument" explicates the functioning of civil society 
characterized by a plurality of memberships, networks and 
associations that create a variety of interpersonal relationships. 
This model of civil society defines community broadly so as to 
include all varieties of social and economic relations, as well as 
those which are overtly political. Small and loose communities with 
citizens having multiple memberships results in a civil society 
characterized by the expression of a diversity of opinions on a 
variety of topics. The citizens of civil society are "connected and 
responsible," in a way which encourages civic spirit. Please see 
Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy, ed. Chnatal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992), 107. 
The epistemology here is consonant with communitarianism because 
political theory is broadly defined, and understood as the network 
of shared understandings on which civil society functions.
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The communitarian conception of citizenship is 
predicated on the capacity of the community to serve as the 
context and reference point for shared understandings. 
Community is where basic values are worked out and 
propagated. By living in a community, citizens learn the 
characteristics and distinctives of the group they are 
members of. Consequently, community is the most influential 
variable in what citizenship means to citizens. The 
communitarian self is a citizen who relies on shared 
understandings to make decisions which are either abstract 
or practical. This analysis of the communitarian self as the 
prototypical citizen raises two points also found in 
critiques of communitarianism by liberal individualists. 
First, because the autonomy and individuality of this 
citizen are underdeveloped, he/she lacks the resources which 
would be needed in order to evaluate the validity and 
appropriateness of both the shared understandings and their 
implications. Second, the communitarian notion of 
citizenship leaves undefined the distinction between the 
political and the social, between the leaders and the led, 
and between the public and private realms. It is on these 
bases that the communitarian conception of citizenship is 
most vulnerable to criticism by liberal individualists.
We find that the communitarian self is not inclined 
toward the formation or expression of autonomous opinions 
and critical assessments of the community. The extent of the
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influence of the communal environment in the formation of 
the identity of the communitarian self precludes the 
likelihood of the individual functioning in this manner. 
Consequently, collected communitarian selves are expected to 
engage only in the activities which we would associate with 
the first part of the hermeneutic circle. However, public 
discourse in the communitarian perception differs from the 
hermeneutic model in the following way. The hermeneutic 
model of democracy expects that community dialogue will 
produce sufficient consensus for the making of collective 
choices. The communitarian version of democracy anticipates 
the reverse: that consensus grounded in shared 
understandings will produce public dialogue which will 
uncover areas of agreement; persuasion is unnecessary and 
choices will be obvious.
Democracy as Essential in the Communitarian Vision of the 
Good Life
Surveying communitarian conceptions of citizenship and 
community reveals that further distinctions are needed 
regarding what the term "community" is being used to 
convey.44 In order for community to provide the good life 
and have a positive impact on its members, certain modes of 
relating must characterize community life. The contemporary 
communitarians under discussion clearly suggest, but stop
44 This observation applies to the contemporary authors as well 
as Rousseau, Burke, and Hegel.
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short of explicitly delineating, democratic processes. On 
closer inspection, it thus becomes evident that what makes 
community good, for communitarians, is that shared 
understandings are utilized to promote the first facet of 
hermeneutic democracy. Specifically, we find the assumption 
that community discourse suggests a democratic political 
arrangement because it includes the discourse intended to 
guide decisions on proximate issues.
"Community," as used by communitarians, has two 
distinct connotations. These meanings can be differentiated 
by asking whether the term is employed to endorse 
recognition of the ubiquitous influence of communities in 
contributing to the identity and perceptions of individuals, 
or whether community positively impacts its members, and is 
therefore associated with the good life. In the latter case, 
communitarians rely on the inclusion of the first portion of 
the circle of hermeneutic democracy to explain the 
advantages of community.
If community membership is beneficial and associated 
with the good life we also find a specific type of political 
functioning which is distinctively democratic, and carries 
normative implications since it makes democracy the standard 
for political processes. However, the antecedence of 
community results in its reification; no space is created 
for collective critical self-evaluation and indeed, there is 
no analytical outlet for the examination of fundamental
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common meanings. We find little explanation by 
communitarians of how democratic processes emerge in 
communities, or on what bases this type of functioning is 
legitimated. The debate between communitarianism and liberal 
individualism could only profit from greater clarity by 
communitarians in defining what is meant by "community11 and 
giving a more complete account of why community membership 
is valuable to citizens.
To unravel this one step further, we see that there is 
an aspect of community, which is antecedent to democracy. 
Congenial relationships between community members is the 
facet of community life which furthers democratic-style 
functioning. Communitarian citizens exhibit mutual respect 
and concern.45 The result is the capacity for amicable 
relations between citizens which in turn facilitates 
democracy. The type of democratic discourse which 
communitarians envision is facilitated by, and indeed, 
predicated upon, filial attachments.
Viewing the debate between communitarians and liberal 
individualists from the vantage point of democracy 
highlights their common dependence on democracy but 
differences in the reasons for including it. Communitarians 
depict polities made up of agreeable citizens. Shared 
understandings conduce toward community congeniality, but we
45 It is not entirely clear whether there is an antecedent 
variable which produces these filial bonds, or whether they are a 
consequence of community living.
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find few specifics on how communal political decisions are 
made and carried out. Oblique references to discursive and 
deliberative processes create an impression of smoothly- 
functioning communities. Ostensibly, communities are 
grounded in philia, and therefore have the capacity to build 
on fundamental shared understandings in order to make 
practical collective decisions. Moreover, the assumption of 
democratic functioning by communitarians lends an aura of 
legitimacy to the exercise of political authority, (whatever 
form that authority may take).46
Compatibility, which paves the way for democratic 
cooperation is apparent in communitarian precepts. The 
concept of the socially-constituted self and a capacity for 
harmonious relationships are consistently linked. The 
sequence of causation is, first, socially-constructed selves 
living as citizens in communities, second, the capacity for 
concordant relations, and third, collective discourse and 
deliberation suggesting functioning democracy. For example, 
Charles Taylor argues that since "participatory self- 
government is itself usually carried out in common actions, 
it is normal to see it as animated by common
46 By contrast, the polity portrayed by liberal individualists 
relies on the consent of citizens to grease the wheels of 
democracy. Self-interested utility maximizers each acting to 
fulfill their own preferences, come together under the auspices of 
democratic procedures in order to negotiate the allocation of goods 
and negotiation of disagreements. This will be discussed in Part
II.
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identifications.1’47 In this instance, the effect of placing 
the community prior to the individual is evident in the 
association of "common action" with "participatory" 
governance.
Walzer clearly assumes that members of the political
community, as the citizen body, are making collective
decisions.48 Near the end of Spheres of Justice, important
goods have been divided along appropriate distributive
patterns in differentiated "spheres of justice." At this
point, democracy, as an institutional arrangement, seems to
win affirmation by default, because it is most likely to
permit the needed distinctions between social goods,
Once we have located ownership, expertise, 
religious knowledge, and so on in their proper 
places and established their autonomy, there is no 
alternative to democracy in the political sphere.
The only thing that can justify undemocratic 
forms of government is an undifferentiated 
conception of social goods...49
According to Michael Sandel, affinity with democracy is 
something which communitarians, rather than liberals, should 
rightfully claim because functioning democracy depends on a 
sense of community. Sandel argues that the alliance between
47 Charles Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 170.
48 From the chapter on "Membership": "Are citizens bound to 
take in strangers?.. .Let us assume that the citizens have no formal
obligations.... Citizens can make some selection among necessitous 
strangers...." Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1983), 45.
49 Ibid. , 303.
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liberal individualism and democracy is uneasy at best
because liberals' association with democracy is grounded in
an instrumental utilitarianism. The liberal regime exhibits,
...two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its 
philosophy: first, a tendency to crowd out 
democratic possibilities? second, a tendency to 
undercut the kind of community on which it 
nonetheless depends.50
In describing the model of society envisioned by 
communitarians, Charles Taylor assumes "collective goals," 
as well as deliberation, because "the nature of the good 
[for the community] requires that it be sought for in 
common."51 Similarly to other communitarians, Taylor 
assumes citizens may belong to several associations, each of 
which is a community. As long as the allegiances appropriate 
to each community, and the demands made of members by each 
community do not conflict, multiple memberships create no 
discord. Regarding relations between sub-groups and the 
nation, there is an issue which distinguishes Taylor from 
other communitarians. Taylor takes up the issue of the 
potential for tension to arise for citizens because of
50 This passage continues: "Where liberty in the early republic 
was understood as a function of democratic institutions and 
dispersed power, liberty in the procedural republic is defined in 
opposition to democracy, as an individual's guarantee against what 
the majority might will." Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural 
Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory. 12 (February 
1984): 93-94.
51 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in 
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann 
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
59.
53
multiple memberships in diverse communities. The nation­
state is the likely source of this tension if it is 
unwilling to permit sub-groups to retain and nurture the 
features which set them apart.
In the work of Alisdair MacIntyre, the "arguments11 
regarding the relative importance of goods within specific 
communities imply democracy,
Moreover when a tradition is in good order it is 
always partially constituted by an argument about 
the goods the pursuit of which gives to that 
tradition its particular point and 
purpose....Traditions, when vital, embody 
continuities of conflict.52
MacIntyre grounds his philosophical positions in a
teleological perspective, where telos is understood in terms
of morality and virtue. MacIntyre has a strong affinity for
Aristotle and the capacity of the Athenian polis to serve as
the context for forming the shared understandings which in
turn encourage virtue and morality. However, these
affinities are not accompanied by an acknowledgement of the
political processes which provide the community with the
ability to engage in constructive "argument" and productive
"conflict." The discourse in MacIntyre's community does not
qualify as democratic because the dialogue does not
incorporate differing moral perspectives, and no persuasion
is taking place. Ostensibly, the views of those with
superior insight will prevail, and conflict will be confined
52 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1981), 206.
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to the ordering of goods, rather than their nature. In 
short, this is a superficial and abbreviated view of 
democracy because the seemingly democratic processes do not 
create a space for deliberative distance by which to foster 
collective self-understanding or critical self-appraisal.
The Communitarian Citizen and the Good Life
As we have seen, community for communitarians is more 
than an escape from the dangers of the state of nature, and 
more than a means of collectively acquiring the necessities 
of life through the division of labor. Community is the 
condition and means of living the good life.53 For 
adherents of liberal individualism, the self is initially
conceived as outside of society. In this condition humans
are free, in that they are autonomous and rational moral 
agents. The challenge is how to maintain and maximize 
freedom once individuals have entered society, and how to do 
so fairly. The political community, especially in the form 
of the state, poses a potential threat to the freedom and 
just treatment of citizens. As we have seen, from the
53 How might a communitarian citizen expect the community to 
nurture the conditions of the good life? The citizen could expect 
the community to advance the shared understandings and traditions 
upon which the community is founded. This may include education of
youth in the heritage of the community, and public events which
recall and rehearse such traditions. In addition, the citizen 
anticipates that as the overarching community, the nation-state, 
will provide for freedom to sustain distinctive sub-communities.
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communitarian standpoint, being outside the political
community would alienate a person from the means of living
the good life. Because humans are social creatures,
philosophical grounding does not originate with hypothetical
pre-social anthropology. It is the community that creates
the context for the good life because it is within the
political community that freedom and justice are
conceptualized and experienced.
Walzer's concern with the community's capacity to
facilitate the good life focuses on just distribution. The
community is the context for citizens' decisions on how
goods should be allocated within their respective spheres.
The most significant collective choice for the community is
how to distribute citizenship,
The primary good that we distribute to one another 
is membership in some human community. And what we 
do with regard to membership structures all our 
other distributive choices: it determines with 
whom we make those choices, from whom we require 
obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate 
goods and services.54
The next goal is to identify a principle capable of guiding
the community toward just decisions. The principle which
Walzer feels best fulfills this requisite is Rawls' maxim of
mutual aid.55
54 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books 
Inc., 1983), 31.
55 Very simply, the principle of mutual aid is the "duty to 
do something good for another...." Like other natural duties, the 
principle of mutual aid is "derived from a contractarian point of 
view," and applies "not only to definite individuals, say to those
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Having established the importance of just distribution, 
(and basing this on the principle of mutual aid), Walzer 
turns to practical questions the political community will 
have to address: "Whom should we admit? Ought we to have 
open admissions? Can we choose among applicants? What are 
the appropriate criteria?"56 An important feature of 
communitarianism is illustrated here: the self-understanding 
of the community will be reflected in the criteria by which 
choices are made on applications for admission. Citizens’ 
collective self-understanding is the theoretic basis for 
these criteria.
The choice of practical criteria would be preceded by 
questions such as: What are the most important aspects of 
our commonality? What are the shared understandings which 
form the foundation of our community? How is the community 
evolving, and what do we see as the best course for the
cooperating together in a particular social arrangement, but to 
persons generally." In Section 51 Rawls explains the Kantian roots 
of the principle of mutual aid, citing The Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Please see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 114-15 and 338.
Liberal aspects of Walzer's communitarianism are evident here. 
First is the use of Rawls at a pivotal juncture. More importantly, 
Rawls’ principle of mutual aid is based on contract. This suggests 
Walzer's acceptance of the need for contract and consent in order 
to explain the community cohesion necessary to make collective 
decisions. The contrast here with other communitarians is the 
apparent requisite of a justification for this cohesion, rather 
than depicting it as an expected by-product of the community 
itself. (We might note this as an additional substantiation of 
Walzer's designation as a liberal communitarian.)
56 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1983), 32.
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future? Are there specific needs evident in the community
potential that new members could help meet? Could an
applicant possess a characteristic which would be
disruptive, or somehow detrimental to the community? Those
possessing citizenship must decide:
"We who are already in the community do the 
choosing, in accordance with our own understanding 
of what membership means in our community and of 
what sort of a community we want to have.
Membership as a social good is constituted by our 
understanding. . . . "57
This gives further credence to the contention that it is not
only community, but democracy, that is crucial to the good
life. Criteria for membership reflect the self-understanding
of the community to the extent that such decisions are made
democratically.
For MacIntyre and Sandel the capacity for citizens to
live the good life depends both on politics within the self
and the politics of the community, and that there be
symmetry between them. The view of the individual and the
community are consonant in that the organization and
internal workings of the individual are a mirror image of
the organization and internal workings of the community.58
57 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1980), 32.
58 Use of a model which exhibits this type of resonance between 
the individual citizen and the community is one of the reasons for 
the association made between contemporary communitarianism and 
Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Interestingly, Sandel gives no 
indication that community deliberation will produce unity of 
opinion. The benefits of community which conduce toward the good 
life include connectedness through dialogue, although dialogue does
58
According to MacIntyre, the community does not intrinsically
conduce toward the good life unless the community is well-
ordered. The question then becomes: what is it that makes
the community well-ordered? MacIntyre's response is the
capacity of the community to provide a "context" for the
"language of morality,"
From within and only from within a given polis,
[the citizen is] already provided with an ordering 
of goods, goods to be achieved by excellence 
within specific and systematic forms of activity, 
integrated into an overall rank order by the 
political activity of those particular 
citizens. . . ,59
In short, the well-ordered community facilitates the 
good life by providing the individual with the means and
not necessarily result in consensus. Nor does Sandel prioritize 
justice as a characteristic or by-product of community. On these 
points Sandel differs from the more idealized vision of community 
of Alisdair MacIntyre, who assumes consensus and emphasizes 
justice. The polis is the archetype of a community for MacIntyre, 
hence, the good life in the community is explicated by referring to 
Aristotle. The pivotal citation referred to by MacIntyre is, "The 
virtue of justice is a feature of a state; for justice is the 
arrangement of the political association, and a sense of justice 
decides what is just." Aristotle, Politics. 1253a29. The phrase
"political association," denotes the framework or organization of 
the association that takes the form of a polis. Aristotle, 
Politics, with notes by Trevor J. Saunders, 61. MacIntyre's esteem 
for the polis, and use of the term to describe the ideal of 
community is evident, "For the polis is human community perfected 
and completed by achieving its telos...." Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?. 97.
59 Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality, 133. 
The skills associated with citizenship relate to assessment of the 
goods (i.e. virtues), which when possessed by citizens, will 
contribute to the community, "Those who participated...would need 
to develop different types of evaluative practice. On the one hand 
they would need to value...those qualities of mind and character 
which would contribute to the realisation of their common good or 
goods." Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1981), 141.
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motivation for the pursuit of goods, (understood here by 
MacIntyre as virtues).60 The pursuit of virtue is a 
community-specific activity. Even though "all faiths and all 
evaluations are equally non-rational; all are subjective 
directions given to sentiment and feeling,"61 the community 
is the starting point for any moral enquiry including the 
search for "the good."62
For Sandel, the good life of a citizen hinges on the 
definition and re-definition of the self available through 
interaction. This raises the issue of democracy as it 
pertains to political membership. The politics of the 
intrasubjective self are a microcosm of the politics of
60 In addition, justice is a condition of the well-ordered 
community. For MacIntyre, justice is crucial to the community as 
the context for the good life. Similarly to an Aristotelian 
perspective, justice is not only a product of institutional 
arrangements but a quality of the well-ordered community itself. 
As MacIntyre points out, ". . .justice is the norm by which the polis 
is ordered, a norm which lacks application apart from the polis." 
Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1988), 97. In short, an individual
separate from the community is deprived of the capacity for 
justice. Conversely, the individual within a community based on a 
shared moral conceptions gains an understanding of justice, and 
rightfully expects just treatment from the community.
61 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1981), 25.
62 "... [T]he self has to find its moral identity in and through 
it membership in communities [but this] does not entail that the 
self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of 
those forms of community. Without these moral particularities to 
begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in 
moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good 
consists." Ibid., 2 05. For a further exposition of Aristotle on the 
good life and implications for community functioning please see 
Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1988), 96-123.
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deliberative democracy. On both levels, democratic discourse
is depicted since each identity has a voice and potential
impact. In Sandel, the intrasubjective self is to the
citizen as the intersubjective citizen is to the community.
Most importantly, it is the communal aspects of identity
which permit joint reasoning, or collective deliberation. In
the words of Sandel,
For persons encumbered in part by a history they 
share with others, knowing oneself...is less a 
strictly private thing. To take seriously such 
deliberation is to allow that my friend may grasp 
something I have missed, may offer a more adequate 
account of the way my identity is engaged in the 
alternatives before me.63
As we have seen, with regard to the citizen and the 
good life, the discourses carried on in the context of 
community have an enlarging and enriching effect on 
individual citizens and the collectivity. Because a portion 
of each member's identity is shared, the notion of "self- 
interest" is expanded to include the interests of the 
community. Contemporary communitarians build here on an 
expansive version of self-interest similar to that 
articulated by Rousseau. The good life is a provision of 
community because the communal identity permits citizens to 
transcend an individualistic and autonomous conception of
63 Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 181.
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self-interest.64 In addition, the communitarian version of 
democracy transcends political conflict with the assumption 
that pre-existent shared understandings will produce 
consensus, and by restricting democratic processes to only 
the first half of the hermeneutic circle.
Walzer, Sandel, Taylor, Miller and MacIntyre all assume 
that citizenship will be meaningful because of citizen 
involvement.65 Collective self-understandings are formed 
when citizens participate in the articulation of consensual 
understandings.66 As we have noted, these communitarians 
all hesitate to make distinctions between the leaders and 
the led, and between the social and public on one hand, and 
the political on the other. Community as a facilitator of
64 For example, "...[H]e, [the citizen] cannot regard politics 
merely as an arena in which to pursue his private interests. He 
must act as a citizen, that is as a member of a collectivity who is 
committed to advancing its common good." David Miller, "Community 
and Citizenship," in Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo 
Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 96.
65 "Citizenship...is not just a matter of possessing
rights.... The citizen has to see himself as playing an active role 
in determining his society*s future, and as taking responsibility 
for the collective decisions that are made." David Miller,
"Community and Citizenship," in Communitarianism and Individualism, 
ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 96.
66 "The crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally
dialogical character.... But we learn these modes of expression
through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages 
needed for self-definition on their own." Please note the influence 
here of Hegel. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in 
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann 
and Charles Taylor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
32.
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the good life presupposes that belonging will be a positive 
experience when citizens are members of communities and 
nation-states which derive their legitimacy from the citizen 
involvement. It is democracy, poorly-articulated but clearly 
suggested, which these notable communitarians use to 
explicate the ability of community to provide the good life.
Democracy is the element which permits the community to 
be set in motion. Each aspect of community can be described 
in a static condition, but it is democracy which provides 
the dynamic for effectual functioning. Recall the 
implications of the constructivist epistemology: as the self 
is constituted by community membership, the community is 
constituted by the manner in which its citizens interpret 
and understand it. The self and the community are 
reciprocally constituted and their meanings are mutually 
reinforcing within given communities. These meanings are in 
an ongoing state of flux, and the flux is expressed through 
discourse which communitarians opt to describe in terms of 
democracy. However, according to a hermeneutic model of 
democracy, a given community could only be considered 
democratic if both of these meanings are continually 
scrutinized and redefined. The shared understandings of 
communitarianism guide proximate decisions, but the insight 
and perspective gained are not utilized to challenge these 
collective values nor to redefine the communityfs self­
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understanding.
Considering the citizen and the good life underscores 
the two meanings given to community by communitarians. The 
first is an ambiguous and reified notion of community. The 
primary value of this idealized community regarding the good 
life, is its capacity to afford a sense of solidarity and 
belonging. But contemporary philosophy and current events 
suggest that community this loosely conceived is not 
necessarily associated with the good life. It is in fact 
vulnerable to criticism on the bases of hypernationalism, 
exclusionary chauvinism and forced collectivism. The 
communitarians we have considered reflect a subtle, but 
crucial distinction between community, undefined beyond 
these basics, and community capable of serving as the 
context for the good life. It is my contention that the 
component of democracy, understood as the first half of the 
circle of hermeneutic processes, is the feature which 
permits differentiation between community as a romanticized 
political and social association, and community which does 
in fact afford opportunities for the good life.
Chapter II:
The Self and Citizen of Liberal Individualism
The History of Conceptions of the Liberal Individualist Self
The long and diverse tradition of liberal individualism 
has resulted in an ideology so broad it often seems capable 
of incorporating both sides of many political philosophy 
debates. However, the views of liberal individualists and 
communitarians on the sources of the identity of the self, 
citizenship, and the nature of democracy, are distinct to 
the point of being mutually exclusive. These disparities 
result from contrasting views of the self. Moreover, these 
differences produce the emphasis by communitarians on the 
first half of the hermeneutic circle, and the emphasis by 
liberal individualists on the second. By placing the 
individual antecedent to the community, liberal 
individualists are compelled to stress the autonomy of the 
self as an agent, over the cohesion of community, and to 
anticipate a profusion of differing opinions on every 
political and social issue, rather than to expect consensus.
The liberal individualist self is a philosophical 
construct which has its genesis in some form of state of 
nature theory. The preferences and interests of this self 
are formed prior to entering society; it is the uniqueness
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of these preferences, combined with the capacity for choice, 
upon which the dignity and value of this person are founded. 
The rights of this self are inalienable because they are 
prepolitical, having been derived from the state of nature. 
Upon entering society, the individuated self will have 
little in common with others, but may choose to join with 
fellow citizens to pursue specific goals which further 
his/her interests. Liberal individualists expect that the 
individual will challenge the polity if it wrongly assumes 
that he/she concurs with its premises or decisions. The 
liberal individualist self is oriented toward finding 
fulfillment in the private sphere, and toward selective 
involvement in the public realm when it suits his/her 
purposes.
To observe the elements of liberal individualism most 
pertinent to citizenship and democracy, the influence of 
three exemplars will be considered. The first is the 
contractarian perspective, as outlined in the work of John 
Locke. Second, is the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill; 
and third, is deontological, as founded in Immanuel Kant. 
Each of these represent liberal individualist views of the 
self, of who and what a citizen is, as well as of the rights 
and responsibilities associated with citizenship.
These three are important representatives of liberal 
individualism because, as we shall see, their premises and 
methodology have demonstrated lasting influence. The
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centrality of the contract in the founding of society 
remains evident in the thought of John Rawls, Judith Shklar, 
and Robert Nozick. John Stuart Mill's emphasis on individual 
liberty, the validity of diverse opinions, and maximization 
of the public good has impacted Ronald Dworkin, Friedrich 
Hayek, Robert Nozick, T.M. Scanlon, and Judith Shklar, among 
others. Immanuel Kant's model of the highly individuated 
self whose reason makes him/her a discerner of universal law 
is apparent in the premises of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin 
and Amy Gutmann.
In Lockean contractarianism, the citizen becomes a part 
of the political community by consenting to the social 
contract. Joining the political community is a logical and 
pragmatic decision for the individual because "civil 
government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of 
the state of nature."67 Locke explicates the universal 
aspects of human nature in the depiction of a state of 
nature which is social, but without government.68 The
67 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: 
MacMillan, 1947), 127. The state of nature is inconvenient indeed 
since each person has the right to judge and to punish. In the 
absence of impartial judges, justice is administered by aggrieved 
parties, resulting in biased, personal judgments, retributive 
justice, and "violence." Ibid., 126-28.
68 Ibid., "Of the State of Nature," Chapter 2, 122-28. 
Responsibilities of citizenship include: desisting from violation 
of the rights of other citizens, recognizing the supreme power of 
civil society in the legislative authority of the government. 
Ibid., 188-94. In the event that the government should become 
tyrannical, the citizens make an "appeal to Heaven." This entails 
initiating a citizen revolution, dissolving the government, and 
founding a new government. Ibid., 131, 207, 224-25, 228-47.
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primary right of the individual who becomes a citizen via 
the social contract is physical security, the chief benefit 
is protection of private property.
That his precepts are reified by the assumption of 
their timelessness is apparent in Locke's initial assertion 
that there is a human condition common to all mankind, "To 
understand political power right...we must consider what 
state all men are naturally in, and that is a state of 
perfect freedom...."69 This premise is also evident in the 
closing paragraph of Two Treatises on Civil Government when 
Locke explains that the transaction between the individual 
and the community, the contract, is a permanent 
agreement.70 Since these are not actual people making an 
explicit contract, but imagined people giving hypothetical 
tacit consent, the contract is not bound to time by the life 
span of individuals or generations, but carries on endlessly 
into the future.
The tenets of utilitarianism which have influenced
69 Ibid. , 122.
70 "To conclude, the power that every individual gave the 
society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals 
again...but will always remain in the community, because without 
this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary 
to the original agreement...". This passage illustrates two 
additional points: first, what the individual gives to the 
community through the contract is power, and second, the community 
is an entity which may or may not exist, but cannot exist without 
the contract. Note the difference between this view and 
communitarianism. Communitarians include the possibility that a 
particular individual may be within a community or outside of any 
community, but the prospect of the absence of community is not 
considered viable. Please see Ibid., 246.
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liberal individualism are oriented toward the capacity of 
the principle of "moral utility" to guide individual and 
collective action. Also referred to as the "greatest 
happiness principle," the principle states, "actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."71 This 
standard becomes the source of "rules and precepts for human 
conduct." In a manner similar to Locke, the utilitarian 
"standard of morality" is applied in the broadest possible 
context: "the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard 
of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own 
happiness," but the happiness of "all mankind," and "the 
whole sentient creation."72
The individual citizen's most valuable asset is an 
understanding of the principle of utility since it is the 
unimpeachable guide for every circumstance of life, 
including how to live in a political community.73 Mill 
claims that the utility principle is in itself sufficient 
for the adjudication of all moral and political decisions.
71 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 
1987), 16.
72 Ibid. , 22, 28.
73 Because utility is the "ultimate source of moral 
obligations, [it] may be invoked to decide between them when their 
demands are incompatible." Ibid., 28. Clearly, the principle of 
utility is a priori to all others, including that of moral 
obligations. Although, John Stuart Mill deals here with the 
possibility of competitive and mutually exclusive moral choices, 
the potential for competition between incommensurable alternatives 
is not broached.
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For the citizen, moral obligations derive from the principle 
of utility, and conversely, it is the principle of utility 
to which citizens are obligated. The salient implication 
here is that citizens do not bear a moral obligation to the 
community in the sense of the collective other, nor to 
traditional beliefs of the community.
The first responsibility of citizenship is not to 
deprive others of "personal liberty, property, or any other 
thing which belongs to another by law."74 The primary right 
of citizenship is the "right to equality of treatment."75 
Although derived on dissimilar bases these tenets are 
obviously compatible with those of Locke. The primary duty 
the utilitarian state is to act as the agent which will 
facilitate the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
For Mill, this is best accomplished by a state founded on 
respect for individual liberty.76 It is significant that 
Millfs endorsement of liberty is subordinate to the summum 
bonum of utilitarianism: the protection of liberty is 
instrumental because liberty is a means not an end; the only
74 Ibid., 59.
75 Ibid., 82.
76 Unlike Locke, this is not a liberty grounded in natural
rights derived from state of nature theory. "Society is not founded
on a contract, and no good purpose is answered by inventing a 
contract in order to deduce social obligations from it; everyone 
who receives the protection of society owes a return for the 
benefit and...should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct 
toward the rest." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 
1974), 141.
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end and reference point being the "greatest happiness 
principle.1
Mill's presentation of utilitarianism as a "science of 
morals"77 has profound epistemological implications. Mill 
argues for the superiority of utilitarianism by claiming 
that it is scientific. As a science, utilitarianism makes 
several claims, the first of which is infallibility. Second, 
as in all science, truth is objective and discoverable. 
Mill's project is to take a discovered truth (i.e. the 
principle of utility), and ascribe to it the stature of 
Truth, as understood in the natural sciences. This Truth is 
then useable in the political and social realms. There is a 
notable contrast here with communitarian epistemology in 
which principles applied in the social realm would be 
considered subjective, contextual and created, rather than 
objective, universal and discoverable.
Kantian deontology is spawned in a world of solitary 
individuals; similarly to contractarianism, deontological 
liberal individualism requires explicit construction of an 
individual. Kant's self is an ideal of a human being, 
although he/she is plagued by a person whom Kant believes 
has "inclinations" which are certainly other than
77 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 
1987), 11. Mill divides previous philosophies into the categories 
of inductive and intuitive. Utilitarianism, by contrast, has a very 
distinguished inception: citing a Platonic dialogue, Mill relates 
that utilitarianism was taught to Socrates by Protagoras. Ibid., 
10.
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constructive. In the social and political contexts, the 
dilemmas which Kant deals with are largely created by the 
propensities of this base, or natural man.78
The Kantian dichotomization of the self raises the 
issue of whether it will be noble or base man who serves as 
the model for the citizen. Kant never resolves this 
question, although the citizen as natural man is obviously a 
predominant consideration in the design of robust state 
institutions, and his strong endorsement of citizen 
compliance with the rule of law. It appears that the higher 
self is the author of laws which exercise control over the 
lower self. On one hand, the Kantian self is a rational 
being, appearing prior to the advent of society, and is a 
discerner and maker of universal law. However, this 
individual, as a citizen, experiences conflict with other 
citizens in day-to-day dealings, and behaves in a less than 
civil manner,
Man is an animal which, if it lives among others of its 
kind, requires a master...who will break his will and 
force him to obey a will that is universally valid, 
under which each can be free.79
78 Please see Immanuel Kant, Conjectural Beginning of Human 
History, Idea for a Universal History, and Perpetual Peace.
79 Ibid., 17. After emphasizing the need for an entity capable 
of establishing and maintaining order, Kant reveals that the 
solution to this dilemma is strong societal law. Kant asserts that 
inevitable societal dissension will be the catalyst which nurtures 
the development of human potential, "The means employed by Nature 
to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is 
their antagonism in society." Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal 
History," in On History, ed. Lewis Beck (New York: MacMillan, 
1963), 15.
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A similar dichotomization of human nature is evident in 
Locke's explication of the need for societal, (i.e."known")-, 
law,
First, there wants an established, settled, known law, 
received and allowed by common consent to the standard 
of right and wrong...for though the law of nature be 
plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet 
men, being biased by their interest as well as 
ignorant... are not apt to allow of it as a law binding 
to them. . . .80
The validity of the law of nature is derived from the fact 
that it is self-evident truth. The hypothetical "rational" 
person would grasp it, although actual individuals are 
biased and ignorant, and therefore likely to miss it. The 
"great law of nature" is: 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by 
man shall his blood be shed'."81 It is clear that the human 
being must be removed from the realm of the law of nature, 
and moved to civil society, where the state administers the 
laws. For these three classical liberal individualists, the 
model of the self with both an higher and lower nature is 
the prototype of the citizen. Examining this model of the 
self offers insight into liberal individualism's need for 
democracy. Democracy offers to liberal individualism a 
political arrangement which will reinforce the nobler 
inclinations of the self, and buffer the effects of 
separateness and isolation. Higher man is capable of using
80 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. (New York: 
MacMillan, 1947), 184.
81 Ibid., 12 6.
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reason to create appropriate laws, but concerns regarding 
the man of base nature are evident in the design of 
institutions, and the outlining of procedures for the 
mediation of controversy.
These observations on the dichotomization of the self 
set the stage for what we earlier referred to as the central 
problem of citizenship for liberal individualists. The model
of the autonomous self is a being who is not only unique,
/
but alienated. The individual opinions of this self are 
validated by grounding them in a presocial condition. This 
means that the individuality of the self is substantiated by 
how little he/she has in common with others. Only the 
rhetorical tools of contract and consent are capable of 
transforming this model of the self into a citizen. The 
central problem of citizenship for liberal individualists is 
this tension between autonomous individuals with their 
diverse interests, and the polity which must not only guard 
individual liberty, but maintain order by compelling 
citizens to comply with the rule of law. This tension is 
evident in the thought of Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Kant.82
82 The difficulties associated with transposing the highly 
individuated self into a citizen are apparent in Mill's On Liberty. 
For example, "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind 
would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if 
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." Later 
in the text, Mill goes on to warn: "No one pretends that actions 
should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose 
their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed 
are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation 
to some mischievous act." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: 
Penguin, 1974), 76, 119. Locke and Kant also encounter and deal
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The dichotomization of the self by liberal 
individualists is further indication of the reification of 
the self, particularly the "higher self." By making the 
individuated self the first principle for all theory, 
liberal individualists overlook both the antecedent 
variables in the constitution and identity of the self, as 
well as the consequences using the self as the point of 
inception. This observation, in the inverse, can be made 
regarding communitarians: by claiming the community as prior 
to the individual and using it as the groundwork for theory, 
communitarians overlook the antecedent factors in the 
composition of a community, and the consequences of making 
the community the foundation of all tenets. I would suggest 
that the reification of the self by liberal individualists, 
and of community by communitarians precludes the immanence 
and reality of democratic processes and political conflict, 
and the complementarity and dynamism produced by both halves 
of the hermeneutic circle functioning in a mutually- 
reinforcing balance.
The communitarian conception of citizenship is premised 
on theoretical and practical particularism, as well as an
absence of universality with regard to either "truths" or
with the resolution of this tension. On Locke, please compare 
Chapter 2, "Of the State of Nature," of The Second Treatise on 
Government, with Chapter 18, "Of Tyranny," where Locke asserts: 
"Wherever law ends tyranny begins." Ibid., 224. Regarding Kant, 
consider the contrast between the idealized self of "The Groundwork 
of the Metaphysic of Morals," with the self as a citizen in "Idea
for a Universal History," and "Perpetual Peace."
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prescriptives. By contrast, Locke, Mill and Kant, as well as 
contemporary liberal individualists convey principles and 
prescriptives intended to transcend time and space. Whereas 
communitarian ideological authority and applicability rest 
on the claim of a realistic representation of human nature 
and associative life, liberal individualist claims of 
authority and applicability are grounded in an appeal to 
universal truth.83
References to "rational men" illustrate the technique 
used in order to substantiate the validity of the "truths1 
being conveyed. "Rational men" are used as the foil by which 
to affirm the reasonableness of basic assumptions, thereby 
creating an impression of consensus. Rather than speaking in 
the first person these liberal individualists present their 
premises and principles as those on which rational men would
83 According to these three traditional liberal individualists, 
reason is the source of universal truth, "Men living together 
according to reason, without a common superior on earth with 
authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature." 
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: MacMillan,
1947), 130; please see also Ibid., 124-26. "No one can be a great 
thinker who does not recognize that as a thinker it is his first 
duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead." 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974), 95. "But
between him and that imagined place of bliss, restless reason would 
interpose itself, irresistibly impelling him to develop the 
faculties implanted within him. It would not permit him to return 
to that crude and simple state from which it had driven him to 
begin with." Immanuel Kant, "Conjectural Beginnings of Human 
History," in On History, ed. Lewis Beck (New York: MacMillan,
1963), 59.
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agree.84 The logical converse of this is an important 
epistemological point: agreement becomes the standard of 
rationality— if the hearer is rational, he/she will 
concur.85
With regard to the debate between communitarianism and 
liberal individualism, these premises profoundly influence 
conceptions of citizenship and community. For liberal 
individualists, citizenship and community, like truth, exist 
in a realm beyond time. Is the epistemology of liberal 
individualism pitched at a higher level of abstraction than 
that of communitarianism? With regard to theoretical 
foundations grounded in claims of transcendent truth, the 
response must be affirmative. The epistemology of 
communitarians is however, highly abstracted, as evidenced 
in the reliance on models of community which are idealized
84 Locke illustrates the premise that reason affords 
understanding of the most basic law, that is, the law of nature, 
while adding as a caveat the possibility that due to the base 
nature, persons may not be consistently capable of adhering to this 
law, "Though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest as well 
as ignorant for want of studying it, are not apt to allow of it as 
a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular 
cases." John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: 
MacMillan, 1947), 184.
85 Michael Oakeshott explains the connection between 
individualism and liberal rationalism as deriving from the 
"Rationalist" setting him/herself as the gauge of appropriate 
thought: "[the Rationalist]... is something of an individualist, 
finding it difficult to believe that anyone who can think honestly 
and clearly will think differently from himself." Michael 
Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Rationalism in Politics 
and Other Essays. (London: Metheun and Company, Ltd., 1969), 2.
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or wholly imagined.86
The Liberal Individualist Self as the Prototype for the 
Citizen
The self constructed presocially and prepolitically is 
the cornerstone of liberal individualist conceptions of the 
citizen. In a contractarian model, the self is a priori to 
society and community87, the needs and desires of the self
86 Instances here include: Sandel's communities of socially- 
constituted persons, MacIntyre's eras of thought and tradition 
which appear as communities, (for MacIntyre, the dialogue of 
philosophy is the discourse between different eras of thought), and 
Walzer's spheres of justice where meanings are internally 
established and context specific. A recent text which examines 
potential negative implications of imagined communities is Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism. Examples of historical communities, used by 
the communitarian authors cited in this essay include fifth-century 
Athens, medieval Europe, and colonial America. Liberal 
individualist critics charge that these three historical examples 
do not qualify as "communities." On this point, please see Derek 
Phillips, Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian 
Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Phillips
argues: "The historical prevalence of the kind of community they 
describe is a fiction. It rests on a myth that looks to the past 
for reassurance and guidance." Ibid., 150. The disagreement here 
highlights the differences in the epistemological grounding of 
liberal individualists relative to that of communitarians. From the 
standpoint of communitarians, historical veracity may not be 
crucial. The interpretevistic epistemology of communitarians 
suggests that the purposes of the "histories" for communities may 
be somewhat mythologic, in that they are valued for their capacity 
to provide sentiments of rootedness and commonality.
87 In the language of liberal individualism, the term "society" 
often describes the collectivity of persons linked together through 
social, economic or political ties. In the language of 
communitarian ism, the word "community" is used in an analogous 
manner, although the word carries slightly different connotations. 
In my view, the choice of the word "community" by communitarians 
indicates a desire to emphasize the collegial aspects of collective 
relationships over the ostensibly depersonal implications of the 
word "society," as used by liberal individualists. For the purpose 
of clarity, I use the words "society" and "community"
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having been formed in the state of nature. The consequence 
is a self as the citizen endowed with inalienable rights 
derived from the presocial realm, but which the state must 
protect.88 In utilitarian models, the individual self is 
the basis for the model citizen because the individual is 
the source of preferences, the fulfillment of which conduce 
to happiness.89 The responsibility of the community and/or 
state vis-a-vis citizens is to aggregate these preferences 
and use them to guide policy.
As we have seen, the self of deontological ethics is 
shaped by presocial propensities which are both positive and 
negative. Once in community, the self is transformed into a 
citizen through recognition of his/her capacity for 
morality, and adherence to societal law.90 The Kantian
interchangeably.
88 "Concern with rights is based largely on the warranted 
supposition that we have significantly differing ideas of the good 
and that we are interested in the freedom to put our own 
conceptions into practice." T. M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and 
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 107.
89 "The only power deserving the name is that of governments 
while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and 
instincts of masses." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: 
Penguin, 1974), 131.
90 "To the Idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the 
concept of autonomy, and to this in turn the universal principle of 
morality. . . .We see now that when we think of ourselves as free, we 
transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and 
recognize the autonomy of the will together with its consequence—  
morality...." Immanuel Kant, "A Critique of Pure Practical Reason," 
in The Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1964), 120-21.
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roots of this perspective, as well as the thought of
contemporary liberal individualists indicate that movement
from solitary individuality to citizenship, via the
contract, is a volitional act. This focuses two issues. The
first is the importance to human identity of the capacity
for choice. Second, community is not such by nature, but by
the aggregated effect of these acts.
The capacity for choice is highlighted when Rawlsian
individuals emerge from the isolation of the original
position to come together in communities. The priority of
the right over the good is determinative not only of the
capacity of the community to provide justice, but of how
individuals will view each other and the collectivity.91
The Rawlsian self as a citizen is vividly aware of his/her
obligations as a "moral person," and of the rights resulting
from autonomy,
[In] a plurality of persons... their fundamental 
interest in liberty and in the means to make fair 
use of it is the expression of their seeing 
themselves as primarily moral persons with an 
equal right to choose their mode of life.92
For our purposes, the emphasis on individuality is more
crucial than the implications for deontological morality. We
are here less interested in obligations derived from the
original position than in the place of the individual in the
91 "Now in justice as fairness [there is] the priority of right 
and the Kantian interpretation." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 563.
92 Ibid., 563.
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Rawlsian model. In this regard, the significance of the 
individual, as conceptualized here, cannot be over­
estimated. The self outlined in the original position is for 
Rawls, "an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean 
point for judging the basic structure of society."93 When 
one considers the clarity of this statement combined with 
the influence of Rawls over the past two and half decades, 
inception of the term "liberal individualism" and genesis of 
the debate in which we are engaged become clearer.
Individualism conceptually defines not only the terms 
of justice, but more fundamentally, ontology, and therefore 
the type of theory that may be constructed. The totality of
what the community may entail is predicated on this model of
the self,
The essential idea is that we want to account for 
the social values, for the intrinsic good of 
institutional, community, and associative 
activities, by a conception of justice that in its 
theoretical basis is individualistic.94
This illustrates the mutual exclusivity of the communitarian
and liberal individualist conceptions of the self. In the
case of Rawls, the individuated self emerges from behind the
veil to become a member of the just society, and a citizen
of the redistributive state. There are other paths, however,
that the original self of liberal individualism may follow.




in state of nature theory.95 The degree of individuation of 
the self, combined with reliance on state of nature origins, 
also results in a community that is created and artificial. 
Nozick explains that the only promising way of 
“understanding the whole political realm" is to "explain it 
in terms of the nonpolitical."96 Notwithstanding obvious 
differences, Rawls' self behind the veil, and Nozick1s self 
in the state of nature, serve analogous purposes. The self 
behind the veil is an autonomous self, stripped of all that 
could prevent the making of rational choices. The self in
Nozick1s state of nature is a unique being whose
separateness is the credential of his/her capacity as a 
moral agent. Both selves are reified models used as first
principles, which consequently become determinative of the
structure of community.97
The selves of Nozick, and of Rawls, as prototypes of
95 "A theory of a state of nature that begins with fundamental 
general descriptions of morally permissible and impermissible 
actions, and of deeply based reasons why some persons in any 
society would violate these moral constraints...will serve our 
explanatory purposes, even if no actual state ever arose that way." 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 
1974), 7.
96 Ibid. , 6.
97 For Nozick, it is the separateness of individuals which 
precludes a community any more elaborate than the minimal state. 
The stature and distinctiveness of this self indicate that there 
are as many "highest goods" as there are people, "Why not hold that 
some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons 
more, for the sake of the overall social good? There is no social 
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. 
There are only...different individual people with their own 
individual lives." Ibid., 33.
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the citizen are not created with the capacity or need for 
collective deliberation. If collective decisions are in 
order, this citizen enters discourse with preferences and 
opinions fully formed. Since the perspectives of the citizen 
are formed pre-socially, neither the broadening of 
viewpoints, nor persuasion, are objectives of political 
processes. Community serves utilitarian purposes by offering 
conveniences associated with the division of labor.98 
Rawls' veil of ignorance and Nozick's state of nature theory 
ascribe dignity to the self based on rationality, autonomy, 
and uniqueness.
From the standpoint of communitarians, this is 
unacceptable because it precludes the possibility of a self 
capable of the bonds upon which the communities (of 
communitarians) are built.99 Once again, this illustrates 
the contrast between liberal individualists and 
communitarians on the purposes and benefits of citizenship.
98 Ibid. , 33, 32.
The contrast between liberal individualists and 
communitarians on this point is drawn succinctly by Michael Sandel: 
"What is denied to the unencumbered self, [that is, the liberal 
individualist self], is the possibility of membership in any 
community. . .where the self itself could be at stake. Such a 
community— call it constitutive as against merely cooperative—  
would engage the identity as well as the interests of the 
participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more 
thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can know." Michael Sandel, 
"The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political 
Theory 12 (February 1984): 87. Also, please see Michael Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 64.
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The liberal individualist self as a citizen has need of a 
political community, in the form of a state, which offers 
protection from the violation of his/her individual rights. 
The communitarian self as a citizen needs the community in a 
much more fundamental sense, since it is constitutive: the 
community is an overriding variable in the formation of 
his/her identity and capacity for choice. The antecedent 
community provides a sense of belonging and grounding in 
shared understandings which are the fundamental referents 
necessary for both individual and collective choices. For 
liberal individualists, society, community, and political 
institutions are products of interaction between 
individuals. For communitarians, community is natural, and 
the self is a product of the positive and ineluctable 
influence of community. Hence, community is crucial to the 
identity and development of the self.
The dignity of the self of liberal individualism is 
revealed in the individual's ability to formulate his/her 
personal conception of the good.100 David Gauthier's self 
constructed outside of community is similar to that of
100 For example, "The liberal individual has her own conception 
of the good." David Gauthier, "The Liberal Individual," in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner 
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 154; also, 
"The government must be neutral on what might be called the 
question of the good life....Since the citizens of a society differ 
in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals 
if it prefers one conception to another...." Ronald Dworkin, 
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 127.
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Nozick and Stephen Macedo, in this important sense: The
possibility of a change in viewpoint occurs within the self,
rather than in the context of community,
The good of each person expresses her 
preferences....Thus the liberal individual must 
have the capacity to reflect on her preferences, 
and to alter them in the light of reflection; this 
capacity makes her autonomous.101
The influence of grounding theory in a view of individuals
in the state of nature, or behind the veil, is thus
clarified: the separateness of the self who is constituted
presocially is maintained after entrance into a community by
the uniqueness of individual conceptions of the good, which
in turn leads to autonomy of deliberation and reflection,
and individual opinions.
Relevant to our discussion this means that the
individual enters the social realm, including public
discourse, with opinions already formed. Therefore,
transformation of the perspectives of individuals is not one
of the purposes served by community. The pertinent issues
regarding public discourse are substantially different for
liberal individualists than for communitarians. For liberal
individualists, questions regarding what will transpire when
101 David Gauthier, "The Liberal Individual," in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner 
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 154. In the 
words of Macedo, "The ideal liberal personality is characterized by 
reflective self-awareness, active self-control, a willingness to 
engage in self-criticism, and openness to change, and critical 
support for the public morality of liberal justice." Stephen 
Macedo, Liberal Virtues, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
251.
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the dessemination of information and public dialogue occur 
include how to encourage citizens to inform themselves, 
deciding which topics ought to be on the agenda and why, 
conflict resolution, and avoiding the tyranny of the 
majority.
For liberal individualists, the initial animating 
movement of theory is the movement from individuals in the 
state of nature, or behind the veil, into society. The point 
which best highlights the differences between liberal 
individualist and communitarian selves, is that for liberal 
individualists, this does not result in a self embedded in a 
specific community of origin, but rather a conceptualization 
of the self embedded in cosmopolitan society writ large. As 
Amy Gutmann points out, "Rawls derives principles of 
justice...from our identification with all free and rational 
beings rather than with particular communities."102
One additional point on the individuated self as the 
prototype for the citizen: agency and justification are both 
grounded in the individual. Moreover the rights ascribed to 
the citizen are inalienable because they are derived from 
the model of the self in the presocial state of nature. 
Therefore citizenship is a legally prescribed status. Basic 
points of consensus are postulated on the premise that they
102 Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," in 
Communitarianism and Individualism, ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner 
De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125.
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are issues on which reasonable people would agree.103 In 
this schema, the individual is one of two possible agents, 
the other being the state. With regard to the conception of 
citizenship, the structure and purposes of political 
institutions including citizenship, are justified using the 
model of the self as the reference point.
The community is subordinate to the individual; when 
the self joins society, the model of the self generates the 
prototype of the citizen and the structure of political 
institutions. The liberal individualist model of the self 
generates theories of citizenship and democracy in which the 
individual is equipped only to engage in the second half of 
the hermeneutic process. Liberal individualism does not 
provide for the creation of shared understandings, or 
comprehension of what would explain their existence. 
Consequently, fundamental agreements which serve as the 
context for collective reasoning are in the form of codified 
law. However, the liberal individualist citizen is oriented 
toward a society which reflects a myriad of different 
opinions. Indeed, the validity of these differences are 
validated by the premises of the model of the self. Citizens 
are geared toward evaluation of the polity relative to their 
individual interests, and toward the critical appraisal of 
areas of consensus, where these are impacting public policy.
103 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 16.
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The Liberal Individualist Conception of Citizenship
For liberal individualists, citizens are individuals 
who leave the state of nature to join a polity. Accordingly, 
citizenship is the formalization of ties between individuals 
and the state, and is characterized as a status and a set of 
rights. Primary issues of citizenship involve who may be a 
citizen and what the rights of citizenship are. Normative 
understandings determine the statutory arrangements that 
guide adjudication when citizens’ pursuit of their interests 
result in conflict.104 In addition, citizenship 
institutionalizes the boundary between public and private 
life, so that individuals may be protected from violation of 
their rights by others or by the state, and be free to 
pursue individual conceptions of the good life.105
As we have seen, the self of liberal individualism has
104 The prospect of conflict is clearly a concern of liberal 
individualists. In the words of Ronald Dworkin, "citizens have 
different theories of the good and hence difference 
preferences....The liberal, as lawgiver, now needs mechanisms to 
satisfy the principles of equal treatment in spite of these 
disagreements." Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Public and Private 
Morality. ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 13 0. Rawls also anticipates conflict,
”[J]ustice is the virtue of practices where there are competing 
interests and where persons feel entitled to press their rights on 
each other." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), 129. For Rawls, conflict may be
unavoidable, but adherence to the principles of justice provide a 
matrix for adjudication and a fair outcome.
105 ”...[T]he case for rights (or moral rules) is seen to rest 
on their role in promoting maximum utility through the coordination 
of individual action." T.M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and Fairness," 
in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge, 
Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 106.
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a personal identity with preferences, interests, and the 
ability to make appropriate choices. This helps explain why 
the tenets of liberal society are rights-based and rule- 
based. Accordingly, the liberal individualist conception of 
citizenship is oriented toward defining and defending the 
rights of citizens and outsiders, and determining rules by 
which this may be accomplished justly. If all individuals 
have interests, and becoming the citizen of a state guards 
those interests by transposing them to institutionalized 
rights, accountability to these principles indicates that 
states exhibit an openness toward those wishing to become 
citizens.
Applying for citizenship is thus an action paralleling 
the hypothetical picture of an individual seeking to 
conclude a social contract with a state. This analogy is 
based on a familiar liberal principle: the autonomy of all 
individuals as rational moral agents is the basis for self- 
determination. When translated into policy terms, self- 
determination indicates freedom of migration. As we are 
seeing, this raises specific questions, such as, on what 
grounds can liberal states control immigration and limit 
access to citizenship? Since the tenet of the autonomy of 
individuals is applied universally rather than selectively, 
this issue is unavoidable.
When unemployment and inter-ethnic tensions are low, 
the potential for conflict between the individual autonomy
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principle and the corresponding policy of openness to 
immigration may not be apparent. However, in the United 
States and Western Europe, unemployment, the need for fiscal 
restraint, and resurgent nationalism are giving rise to 
calls by interest groups and political parties to curb 
immigration. This situation is fueling the debate between 
liberal individualism and communitarianism because 
communitarian arguments for the defensibility of the 
physical and ideological boundaries of communities are being 
adapted by those calling for tighter citizenship 
requirements, and more stringent enforcement.106
Since liberal individualist citizenship is a 
contractual arrangement defined by the legal definition of 
rights, we may deduce that a nation"s laws reflect its view 
of citizenship.107 For those already possessing
1°6 TJle use justifications of the concept of difference, as 
found in some communitarian writings, by proponents of 
hypernationalism and anti-immigration movements are one aspect of 
the current debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians on the topic of citizenship. Examples include 
Franklin Hugh Adler, '"Racism, Difference and the Right in France," 
Paper delivered at the 1994 meeting of the American Political 
Science Association; Jasjeet S. Sekhon, "Nationalism, Racism, and 
Communitarianism," Paper delivered a the 1994 meeting of the 
American Political Science Association; Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism; 
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism; Michael Ignatieff, Blood and 
Belonging.
107 As an outstanding recent example of scholarship along these 
lines, Rogers Brubaker has developed a model for understanding the 
sources of the citizenship laws of liberal democracies by analyzing 
nations' self-understandings. This study is historically well- 
documented and undermines the liberal claim of a grounding in 
principles which are universally applicable. The implications of 
Brubaker's model indicate that even among industrialized liberal
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citizenship, liberal individualist conceptions build on a 
contractarian Lockean model.108 This yields a pragmatic 
deontology, based on the human need for physical security 
and the capacity of a state to provide it. The Lockean 
groundwork is supplemented by Kantian and Rawlsian moral 
deontology, which emphasizes the self as a moral agent, and 
the state as morally-defensible because of its ability to 
enforce law and implement justice. For Rawls, the state is 
obligated to provide the context for the operationalization 
of the principles of justice.109 However, the content of 
the two principles necessitates redistribution based on 
judgments regarding equality of opportunity, which in turn
democracies, substantial differences exist in nations1 self­
perception, and therefore in citizenship laws. Please see Rogers 
Brubaker, Citizenship in France and Germany; also Rogers Brubaker, 
"International Migration: A Challenge for Humanity," International 
Migration Review 25 (Winter 1991): 946-57.
108 The most important rights institutionalized by the contract 
are the right to self-preservation, and the right to preservation 
of one's property. It is the "fundamental, sacred, and unalterable 
law of self-preservation for which men entered into society." John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: MacMillan, 1947), 197. 
"The great and chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths and 
putting themselves under government is the preservation of their 
property." Ibid., 184.
109 As we know, the principles of justice are supported by a 
"thin account of the good." "...[T]he circumstances of justice 
obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward 
conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under 
conditions of moderate scarcity." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 128; also, "The
principles of justice have a definite content and the argument 
supporting them uses only the thin account of the good and its list 
of primary goods." Ibid., 564.
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requires an elaborate state.110
Nozick does not use the language of justice and the 
well-ordered society, but justifies the minimalist state on 
grounds that, given the diversity and natural rights of 
persons, it is the fairest arrangement. In this state, not 
only the state itself, but the responsibilities of 
citizenship, are minimal. Citizens must be vigilant in 
preventing the state from evolving into more than what is 
indicated by a parsimonious list of appropriate functions. 
The citizen of Nozick*s model possesses the latitude to make 
a broad array of personal decisions, and therefore, to 
restrict the state to the "narrow functions of 
protection. ... *'111 The dignity of the citizen is only 
ensured under these circumstances.112
110 Friedrich Hayek contends that application of Rawls' 
principles of justice will result, inter alia. in problems
enforcing citizenship laws: "Rather than admit people to the
advantages that living in their country offers, a nation will
prefer to keep them out altogether; for, once admitted, they will
soon claim as a right a particular , share of its wealth. The
conception that citizenship or even residence in a country confers 
a claim to a particular standard of living is becoming a source of 
international friction." Friedrich Hayek "Equality, Value and 
Merit," in Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 96.
111 Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), ix.
112 "The minimal state treats us an inviolate individuals, who 
may not be use in certain ways by others as means, or tools, or 
instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual 
rights with the dignity this constitutes." Ibid., 333-34. Also, 
"[A]s soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially 
the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it....But 
there is no room for entertaining any such questions when a 
person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides
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For our purposes, the crucial point here is that for 
both Rawls and Nozick, the antecedence of the individuated 
self predicates the model of the citizen, the structure of 
the state, and the rules and benefits of citizenship. The 
liberal individualist version of democracy suggests that at 
each of these strata, all the elements necessary for the 
operation of the second part of the hermeneutic circle are 
present. Under these constraints, citizenship is an 
agreement entered into where state and citizen both have 
obligations. In this regard, Rawls concentrates on the 
obligations of the state to provide conditions favorable to 
implementation of the two principles of justice, and thereby 
provide equality of opportunity and just distribution of 
social goods under the condition of scarcity.113 Nozick 
focuses on the importance of individuals who, as citizens, 
are vigilant in deterring the state from becoming unwieldy 
and intrusive. The state supervises services which afford 
basic protection and allows each citizen to pursue their
himself...." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974), 
141-42.
113 The two principles of justice are, "First: each person is 
to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached 
to positions and offices open to all." John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 60.
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unique vision of utopia.114 Nozick1 s utopia is the 
epistemological equivalent of Rawls' well-ordered society, 
since both are idealized constructions of the optimal 
context in which humans live together.
All of this highlights differences in the liberal 
individualist and communitarian views of citizenship. The 
liberal individualist construction of the self and the 
citizen precludes the possibility that the individual could 
be constitutively impacted by a community in the 
communitarian sense. For communitarians, the community is 
the entity which shapes formation of the interests, 
preferences, and identities of its members. For 
communitarians, common membership in a community means that 
shared understandings facilitate the making of collective 
decisions.
In Nozick's model it is possible that an individual be 
born into a libertarian community where the highest value is 
placed on the ability of each person to chose the 
appropriate community for him/herself. In this case, the 
individual may chose to move to a community where citizens 
acknowledge and nurture mutually-constitutive bonds. But if 
the individual is already fully constituted, how could
114 For Nozick, there are as many utopias as there are 
individuals, "Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where 
people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and 
attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal 
community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision on 
others." Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974), 312.
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he/she become a part of a community designed to have such an 
high degree of impact on his/her identity? In short, when 
Rawls' individual emerges from behind the veil, and Nozick's 
leaves the state of nature, he/she is already constituted to 
an extent that makes the kind of ties which communitarians 
postulate as the bonds between citizens impossible.
The autonomy and individuation of the self, along with 
the prospect of incommensurable moral claims associated with 
collective choices, indicate that the state must remain 
unbiased in its treatment of individuals, and evaluation of 
policy.115 Implementation of the principle of neutrality 
means that a state must gives equal treatment to all 
citizens, and consider impartially the applications of 
outsiders wishing to gain entrance and citizenship. In
115 Nancy Rosenblum describes the liberal axiom of neutrality 
as the "deliberate distancing of government, and of justifications 
for government action, from official recognition of a view of the 
good life...." Nancy Rosenblum, Introduction in Liberalism and the 
Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 6. According to Ronald Dworkin, since liberalism is 
committed to equality, "political decisions must be, so far as it 
is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good 
life, or of what gives value to life." Ronald Dworkin, 
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 127. In an
effort to reduce contention over incommensurable claims, liberal 
individualists sometimes recommend removing contentious issues from 
the political agenda, (to the extent that this may be possible). 
"The hope of liberal political theory, and the basis of the most 
common solutions to the problem of moral conflict in a pluralist 
society, is that citizens can still agree on principles that would 
remove decisions about the policy from the political agenda. 
Liberals typically invoke higher-order principles, such as 
neutrality and impartiality, that are intended to transcend the 
disagreement on specific policies...." Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus," Ethics 101 
(October 1990): 64.
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addition the state must treat all persons within its borders 
equally.
Categories of rights for differing groups requires 
accepting governmental differentiation between groups of 
individuals, and of the state as a community with boundaries 
which are valid and therefore defensible. In the current 
debate on citizenship boundaries are variously considered in 
physical and/or ideological terms.116 The freedom of 
individuals as moral agents, and the hesitancy of the state 
to impose differing views of the good life emphasize 
diversity.117 But the tenets of liberal individualism offer
116 For example, ^please see Rainier Baubock, "Changing 
Boundaries of Citizenship: The Inclusion of Immigrants in 
Democratic Politics," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting of the 
American Political Science Association? Eric Gorham, "Social 
Citizenship and Its Fetters," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting 
of the American Political Science Association? Julie Mostov, 
"Endangered Citizenship," Paper presented at the 1994 meeting of 
the American Political Science Association? J.M. Barbalet, 
Citizenship. Using the premises of liberal individualism, Baubock 
argues for the inclusion of all persons within the borders of a 
state to some level of citizenship rights on the basis of their 
physical presence. Gorham argues for increased specificity in the 
conceptualization of citizenship by dividing it into four component 
parts? (one of these categories is moral capacity/civic virtue). 
Mostov also takes an ideological approach and argues for a 
strengthening of the liberal concept of citizenship as a means of 
promoting democratic activity in the form of participation which 
will keep a check on government. Barbalet is a re-examination of 
T.H. Marshall's seminal work, Class. Citizenship and Social 
Development. Barbalet updates observations on the correlation 
between citizenship on one hand, and socio-economic status (i.e. 
class), on the other.
117 Stephen Macedo outlines the interconnectedness of the 
liberal tenets of autonomy and neutrality, and their implications 
for the policies of liberal states regarding citizenship: 
"Autonomy, as a liberal ideal... supports the energetic, self- 
critical, and independent virtues of liberal citizenship, and would 
seem to be a prerequisite of flourishing in a diverse, tolerant
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little direction for the mediation between communal 
subgroups within the state, or between citizens and 
outsiders.
For liberal individualists the primary questions which 
define citizenship are how to fairly adjudicate between 
citizens, how to protect citizens from the violation of 
their rights by others or by the state, and how to decide 
the bases for access to citizenship. As a consequence, 
normative theory and practical policy recommendations are 
concerned with the protection of rights, and the formulation 
of rules. Justification for protecting rights is derived 
either from state of nature theory, (as exemplified by Locke 
and Kant), or by application of the greatest happiness 
principle, designed to maximize the happiness of the 
greatest number of citizens. The latter is of course 
grounded in the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, and 
endorses an analog to individual rights: protection of 
individual liberty since it is the means of implementing the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.
liberal society. Liberalism is generally anti-paternalistic: it
seeks to respect persons with basic reflective capacities and 
resists the political promotion of thickly textured common 
conceptions of the good life." Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 252-53.
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Democracy as Essential in the Liberal Individualist: 
Conception of a Well-Ordered Society
The premises of the individual1s autonomy and right to 
self-determination, and the value of neutrality on the part 
of the polity, mean that liberal individualists must account 
for why democracy, as a regime type, is the optimal choice. 
Simply put, why would a state grounded in the tenets of 
liberal individualism choose democratic political 
institutions over some alternative? Given the priorities of 
liberal individualism, democracy is not only an option, but 
essential to the structuring and maintenance of a well- 
ordered society. What we consider modern democracy is the 
favored institutional arrangement of liberalism, but liberal 
individualism has left a distinctive mark on Western notions 
of democracy. Hence the term "liberal democracy."
The highly individuated self of liberal individualism 
is a person with his/her own distinctive notion of the good 
life. Ronald Dworkin emphasizes that a government must treat 
all citizens as eguals, because each individual's notion of 
the good life is equally valid.118 The diversity of liberal 
selves means that "citizens have different theories of the 
good and hence different preferences."119 Individuation
118 "I want to argue that a certain conception of equality, 
which I shall call the liberal conception of equality, is the nerve 
of liberalism." Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Public and Private 
Morality. ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 115.
119 Ibid. , 130.
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indicates autonomy of choice, and this autonomy means
"disagreement" will inevitably occur. Dworkin thus concludes
that "the liberal needs mechanisms to satisfy the principles
of equal treatment in spite of these differences."120 These
considerations frame Dworkin*s explanation as to why
democracy is the logical choice for liberals,
The liberal will decide that there are no better 
mechanisms available, as general political 
institutions, than the two main institutions of 
our own political economy: the economic 
market...and representative democracy.121
Representative democracy is useful to liberalism because it
provides the mechanisms to mediate conflicts resulting from
the plethora of ideas pertaining to the good life.
Judith Shklar similarly asserts that liberals must
defend their choice of an appropriate political system. For
Shklar, "liberalism has one overriding aim: to secure the
political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of
personal freedom."122 The chief requisite for a state
committed to liberal goals is that it create the context for
120 Ibid., 130.
121 Ibid., 130.
122 Judith N. Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism 
and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989) , 21. T.M. Scanlon also emphasizes the
importance of individual liberty and autonomy, "To be concerned 
with individual autonomy is to be concerned with the rights, 
liberties and other conditions necessary for individuals to develop 
their own aims and interests and to make their preferences 
effective in shaping their own lives and contributing to the 
formation of social policy." T.M. Scanlon, "Rights, Goals and 
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 97-98.
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the exercise of individual autonomy. But the most likely
threat to personal freedom is posed by the power of the
state. The paramount goal therefore becomes a state whose
laws grant the conditions for freedom, while at the same
time vesting in citizens the authority necessary to keep the
state in check.123
Guided by these concerns, Shklar sees democracy as the
only sensible choice. In a democracy, the rule of law which
provides for diffusion of power, and free elections, with
the resultant accountability of leaders to the electorate,
are the mechanisms of restraint. According to Shklar,
liberalism has not only adopted, but has defined
contemporary democracy. Democracy is essential to the
liberal individualist conception of a well-ordered society
not because of any intrinsic affinity between liberal and
democratic tenets, but on pragmatic grounds,
The institutions of a pluralist order with 
multiple centers of power and institutionalized 
rights is merely a description of a liberal
123 m p h e  original first principle of liberalism, the rule of 
law....is the prime instrument to restrain governments." Judith N. 
Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, 
ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
37. Shklar's apprehensions regarding governmental power are based 
on the potential of the state to intrude into the private sphere, 
and on the possibility that the state may itself become an agent of 
cruelty and terror. Of course, apprehension regarding the 
possibility for the state to misuse its power is widely articulated 
in liberal individualist writings. John Locke warned that "tyranny 
is the exercise of power beyond right," and would be reflected in 
"actions not directed to the preservation of properties of the 
people, but the satisfaction of... ambition, revenge, covetousness, 
or any other irregular passion." John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government (London: MacMillan, 1947), 222-23.
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political society. It is also of necessity a 
democratic one, because without enough equality 
and power to protect and assert one's rights, 
freedom is but a hope....It is therefore fair to 
say that liberalism is monogamously, faithfully, 
and permanently married to democracy— but it is a 
marriage of convenience.124
John Rawls arrives at his choice of democracy as the 
preferred political system because of its ability to 
transpose the two principles of justice into practicable 
form.125 There is, in fact, a common theme evident in 
Shklar, Dworkin and Rawls which offers insight into the 
liberal individualist attitude toward democracy: democratic 
institutions are chosen for instrumental reasons. Democracy 
is a means to an end. When adapted to the priorities of 
liberal individualism, democracy has the capacity to protect 
individual freedom, to provide for restraint of the state by 
citizens, to set as a goal the equal treatment of all 
citizens, and to make the principle of maximum equal 
individual liberty and the difference principle workable in 
terms of policy.126
124 Judith N. Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism 
and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 37.
125 ". . . [0]nce we try to find a rendering of them [the two 
principles] which treats everyone equally as a moral person, and 
which does not weight men's share in the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation according to their social fortune or luck in the 
natural lottery, it is clear that the democratic interpretation is 
the best choice among the alternatives." John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 75.
126 In Rawls' writings subsequent to A Theory of Justice, 
justification for the principles of justice is grounded less in 
neo-Kantian metaphysics, and more in the contention that the
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The commitment to protection of the division between 
the public and private lives of citizens leads to the 
question of whether the aims of liberal individualism and 
democracy are fully compatible. Securing "the conditions 
necessary for the exercise of personal freedom"127 is 
accomplished by placing individuals' right to privacy (from 
state intrusion into their personal lives) as preeminent 
among the rights of citizens.128 If each citizen has 
his/her view of the good life, and the good life is lived in 
the private realm, this is the logical deduction.129 One 
issue raised by the need for protection from state intrusion
principles are endemic to the democratic political tradition, 
"[S]ince justice as fairness is intended as a political conception 
for a democratic society, it tries to draw solely upon basic 
intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of 
a constitutional democratic regime....Justice as fairness is a 
political conception in part because it starts from within a 
certain political tradition." John Rawls, "Justice As Fairness: 
Political Not Metaphysical," in Communitarianism and Individualism, 
ed. Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 18 9.
127 Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism and 
the Moral Life. ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 21.
128 "Liberalism prohibits collective choices from interfering 
with personal freedom. Democracy promises that they reflect popular 
will. Two competing ends cannot simultaneously be maximized. 
Democracy and liberalism part company when collective choices 
threaten to interfere with personal freedom, or personal freedom 
threatens to interfere with collective choice." Amy Gutmann, "The 
Disharmony of Democracy," in Democratic Community, ed. John Chapman 
and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 134- 
35.
129 Nancy Rosenblum points out that "every version of liberal 
theory draws a boundary between public and private life." Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, Introduction, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. 
Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7.
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is that of accountability. Among the reasons that democracy 
is the favored choice of liberal individualists is, 
democratic forms incorporate channels by which citizens may 
hold the state accountable.130 If elected officials, as 
agents of the state, are answerable to the electorate, 
citizens will be able to protect themselves from an 
overreaching state.131
This being the case, it is often difficult for liberal 
individualists to explain what could motivate a citizen's 
commitment to the state, to a specific community, or to 
other citizens at large. The liberal individualist model of 
the self leaves little room for an altruism which could 
explicate the source of allegiance to a community and a 
state, and a commitment to the collective good, (when the 
collective good is separate or different from the good of an
130 Direct or popular democracy is generally considered 
unrealistic given the overriding private interests of citizens, and 
the size and complexity of the modern nation-state. This being the 
case, liberal individualists have offered a variety of 
recommendations on ways to maximize meaningful political 
participation on the part of citizens. Among these: James Fishkin, 
Democracy and Deliberation; Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist 
Democracy; Amy Gutmann, "The Disharmony of Democracy," in 
Democratic Community.
131 Deliberative democracy is one response on the part of 
liberal individualists to these concerns. Inter alia, deliberative 
democracy pictures the citizen as an autonomous deliberator, who 
takes the acquisition of information and implications of his/her 
political judgments seriously. "The aim of deliberative democracy 
is not popular rule, but autonomy.... The test of a democratic 
political institution is not direct participation by all but 
effective accountability of those who make decisions to those who 
do not." Amy Gutmann, "The Disharmony of Democracy," in Democratic 
Community, ed. John Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York 
University Press, 1993), 144.
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individual).132 If the identity of the citizen is 
constituted pre-socially, are there bonds between citizens 
which could motivate such commitment? What happens when 
private interests conflict with the general good? Under the 
premises of liberal individualism we must expect citizens to 
prioritize private interests over the public good. To the 
extent that filial sentiments and some level of civic 
mindedness among citizens are needed for democratic
132 The absence of factors which can motivate or explain civic 
mindedness in the liberal individualist conception of citizenship 
is clearly a matter of concern. I will mention three views which 
represent a spectrum of opinions. Robert Nozick does not expect 
individuals to set aside private and personal interests to involve 
themselves in a public or political realm. One assumption of the 
minimal state is that individual and state interests do not 
coincide. Citizens enter the social contract only provisionally, 
and must maintain the right to evaluate and endorse or reject 
virtually all state activities. Please see Robert Nozick, Anarchy. 
State, and Utopia. Robert Dahl acknowledges the tension between the 
liberal individualistic pursuit and protection of personal liberty 
on one hand, and the potential benefits to a democratic system of 
citizen involvement and allegiance, on the other. Dahl suggests two 
ways of resolving this conflict. One is by sketching a picture of 
the public mindedness of civic republicanism, ostensibly to be 
fostered through public education. The other is to contend that, 
based on invisible hand theories, public and private interests are 
not really at odds. Consequently citizens' pursuit of their private 
interests will have no detrimental effect on the public good. 
Please see Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Amy 
Gutmann also recognizes potential strife between private freedom, 
and the need for dedication to the collective good in a democracy. 
Gutmann argues that "the real dilemma of modern liberalism...is not 
that people are naturally egoistical, but that they disagree about 
the nature of the good life." Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics 
of Liberalism," in Communitarianism and Individualism. 130. But 
Gutmann also entertains an idealistic vision of the nature and 
capacities of the self— one which encompasses the possibility that 
citizens are willing to learn the skills and interests necessary to 
pursue the good of the whole. Please see Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic 
Education," in Liberalism and the Moral Life? "The Disharmony of 
Democracy," in Democratic Community; also Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus," Ethics 101 
(October 1990): 64-88.
104
functioning, the liberal individualist model of the self and 
the citizen are at odds with the requisites of democracy.
One method of resolving this discord is to apply the 
assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, where market 
forces mediate the distribution of goods as citizens pursue 
individual preferences. Drawing on Adam Smith's depiction of 
the working of the invisible hand can eradicate the 
potential conflict between private and public interests.
From this perspective, liberal democracy is the unfettered 
pursuit of self-interest by all citizens. Yet the activities 
this entails conduce toward the good of the whole. 
Maximization of the public good is an unintended consequence 
of individual citizens pursuing private self-interests.133
Communitarianism does not incorporate a clear 
distinction between the social and political realms, both 
are the domain of the good life and both are public. By 
contrast, liberal individualism places a stark distinction 
between the public and private spheres. Conceptions of the 
good life are formed and pursued in private, while the 
political is associated with the public. The liberal 
individualist citizen is geared toward private pursuit of 
the good life, but expects to live in a well-ordered 
society. This society is well-ordered not because of what
133 "...[T]he case for rights (or moral rules) is seen to rest 
on their role in promoting maximum utility through the coordination 
of individual action." Ronald Dworkin, "Rights, Goals and 
Fairness," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 106.
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he/she may contribute to it, but the through the appropriate 
structuration of institutions, and the order maintained by 
good laws.
In analyzing communitarian thought we noted implicit 
assumptions of democracy. In surveying liberal individualist 
thought we find explicit endorsements of democracy, but of a 
democracy constructed around the premises and aims of 
liberal individualism. The constraints indicated by the 
tenets of liberal individualism permit adaptation of 
democracy in a manner which suits liberal objectives.
Because this version of democracy is grounded in the 
antecedence of the individual, only a coincidental 
convergence of interests can explain instances of consensus 
among citizens. For these reasons, democracy, as conceived 
by liberal individualists, is limited to the functions 
associated with the second portion of the hermeneutic 
circle.
Democracy is essential to liberal individualism because 
the emphasis on personal liberty necessitates a political 
system that can be restrained by citizens, which will 
protect individual rights, and will maintain neutrality by 
avoiding judgments on differing notions of the good life. 
Moreover, since democracy places value on citizen input in 
political decisions, it offers a way of balancing the 
tendencies for the alienation and fragmentation which result 
from the need to mould the individuated self into a citizen.
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Liberal individualism is an important, if not the 
predominant, strand of liberalism. Moreover the 
individualistic aspects of liberal individualism are the 
source of discord between it and communitarianism.
The Liberal Individualist Citizen and the Well-Ordered 
Society
For the liberal individualist citizen, citizenship in a 
liberal democracy is the means of concluding the social 
contract and formalizing the relationship between the 
individual and the state. Possessing or attaining 
citizenship accomplishes several purposes. First, 
citizenship enables the individual to avail him/herself of 
the physical security afforded by membership in a nation­
state. Second, citizenship in a liberal democracy gives the 
individual the legal means by which to thwart the state from 
passing judgment on his/her conception of the good life, and 
the means to prevent the state from intruding into his/her 
private life. Third, citizenship in a liberal democracy 
entitles the individual to just treatment by the state with 
all other citizens. This may involve equal rights in a 
minimal state such as the one outlined by Nozick, equal 
treatment as advocated by Ronald Dworkin, or fair treatment 
as indicated by the difference principle in a Rawlsian 
welfare state. Finally, citizenship in a liberal democracy 
provides the individual with the means of mediating disputes 
with other citizens.
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In communitarianism, democratic processes are evident 
when communitarians describe a community making collective 
choices. There are, as we have noted, areas where the values 
of communitarianism and the aims of democracy are not 
consonant.134 This observation also applies to liberal 
individualism. Democracy is essential to the functioning of 
a well-ordered society, but the melding of liberal values 
and democratic processes is problematic. Examining the 
liberal individualist requisites for forms of governance 
gives insight into how democracy has become essential to 
liberal individualism, and what variety of democracy 
"liberal democracy" is. The priorities of liberal 
individualism for governance are grounded in respect for the 
rights of individuals and the need for safeguards against 
tyranny.
Reconciling these aims with democratic processes puts 
liberal individualists in the position of arguing that the 
autonomous and individuated self is not only egoistic, but
134 Potential areas of friction between communitarian ideas and 
democratic functioning include: a model of the self with intrinsic 
constraints on the extent of autonomous individual deliberation. 
Second, the particularist and contextualist perspective of 
communitarianism provides little guidance on the question of how to 
deal with those outside the community, (whether community is 
conceived as a subgroup of a state, or the state itself). Third, 
the possibility of reliance on a natural aristocracy comprised of 
those with an understanding of virtue and reason, creates the 
potential for an undemocratic hierarchy of leadership. Fourth, if 
foundational shared understandings are turned outward to focus on 
the differences between community members and outsiders, the result 
can be exclusionary chauvinism, and at worst, hypernationalism and 
hate-mongering.
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altruistic as well. The need for some cohesion among the 
citizenry that can serve as the framework for democratic 
decision-making, necessitates explication of how to build 
some basic solidarity. Normative theory in this area focuses 
on the ability of individuals to learn the skills associated 
with democratic citizenship. Such perspectives stress on the 
benefits of education designed to foster an understanding of 
political institutions, respect for the rule of law, the 
value of acquiring political information, and voluntary 
political participation beyond the act of voting.135
An alternative response to the tension between 
individual autonomy and democratic participation is to 
acknowledge that citizens are self-interested, and should 
therefore not be expected to exhibit a desire to engage in 
public activities. This perspective leads to liberal 
individualist conceptions of democracy which are 
minimalistic, where the egoism of the autonomous self is the 
chief determinant of politics. The citizen is a utility 
maximizer who pursues his/her vision of the good life 
privately. The state is a mechanism necessary to provide 
some level of physical security and guarantees of basic 
political and civil rights. Accordingly, the goal of 
equality among citizens is set aside because its
135 For selected examples of this, please see: Amy Gutmann, 
"Undemocratic Education,11 in Liberalism and the Moral Life; William 
Galston, "Civic Education in the Liberal State," in Liberalism and 
the Moral Life; Richard Arneson, "Liberal Democratic Community," in 
Liberal Community; James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation.
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implementation would require excessive state apparatus. 
Democracy is reduced to the requisite of competitive 
elections with the unfettered functioning of the laws of 
supply and demand governing distribution.136
The centrality of the individual in liberalism is 
evident in the three historical exemplars as well as 
contemporary sources. The individual portrayed by Locke has 
fundamental instincts to preserve him/herself and his/her 
property. The contract links the self to the state as a 
citizen and the state is entrusted with protecting the 
inalienable rights of the citizens. In Kant we see the 
dignity of the individual grounded in the capacity for 
choice, and the ability to evaluate prospective actions on 
the basis of whether they are universalizable. Kant also 
reflects a liberal individualistic concern with the 
potential for enmity, and the dire need for established law.
On Liberty particularly reflects John Stuart Mill's 
emphasis on the importance of freedom for each citizen to 
express his unique opinion on matters of public importance. 
However, in the same text, Mill asserts: "No one pretends 
that actions should be as free as opinions."137 The liberal 
individualist model of the self indicates not only political
136 Examples here include: Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of 
Democracy; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy; 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State. and Utopia; Friedrich Hayek, 
"Equality, Value and Merit," in Liberalism and Its Critics.
137 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. 119.
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guarantees for personal liberty, but the requirement of 
political authority capable of maintaining civil order.
These two concerns, which are not entirely harmonious either 
with each other or with the values of democracy, are at the 
core of liberal individualistic thought regarding 
citizenship. The individual is the central reference point 
for conceptions of citizenship and the design of political 
institutions. The importance of the individual as a moral 
agent is evidenced in the conceptualization of the self with 
rights which are inalienable because they are presocial. On 
these grounds citizenship is a legally ascribed status. As 
an epistemological foundation, liberal individualists 
present universalistic first-order principles as those 
tenets upon which reasonable people would agree.
In the liberal individualist model of democratic 
citizenship, the diversity of viewpoints are generated by 
each citizen arriving at his/her preferences and opinions 
independently. The plurality of interests is anticipated on 
the basis of the autonomy of individuals. Public discourse 
is for the purpose of giving to citizens the opportunity to 
relate these opinions. This degree of individuation means 
that the liberal individualist citizen is predisposed toward 
critical appraisal using self-interest as the referent. In 
short, acknowledgement and expectation of diversity in the 
citizen body correspond to a particular perspective on 
democracy, where democracy is associated with what I have
I l l
described as the second half of the hermeneutic circle.
Chapter III:
The Self and Citizen of Hermeneutic Democracy as a Mean
Hermeneutic Democracy as a Medium of Communication Between 
Communitarianism and Liberal Individualism
What can a hermeneutic theory of democracy contribute 
to debate on the topic of citizenship between liberal 
individualists and communitarians? Each of these approaches 
incorporate important facets of democracy in order to 
document the benefits of the polities which their 
perspectives would create. For this reason, a hermeneutic 
theory of democratic citizenship facilitates communication 
between the two schools of thought, as well as elucidating 
their strengths and imbalances. As a theoretical reference 
point, Aristotle advances a hermeneutic model of democracy.
An Aristotelian perspective rebuts the antecedence of 
either the individual or the community which is fundamental 
and determinative for communitarians and liberal 
individualists. A conception of citizenship which draws on 
the resources of hermeneutic democracy, provides a context 
for communication between liberal individualists and 
communitarians because it integrates the socially- 
constituted and individualistic aspects of the self in a 
manner which indicates that these two facets need not be 
mutually exclusive. Similarly, in the hermeneutic model, we
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find symmetry between the individual and collective aspects 
of citizens' involvement in the polity.
As outlined in the Introduction, a hermeneutic model 
conceives of democracy in terms of a two part circle of 
dialectical processes. As the essential ingredient, public 
dialogue is the context for exchange of opinions and making 
decisions on issues at hand. In the first part of the 
hermeneutic circle, such discourse is grounded in the 
interests which citizens share as co-members of a political 
community. Fundamental areas of common concern and consensus 
are the framework for public dialogue. This portion of 
hermeneutic processes reinforces fundamental areas of 
concord in the democratic polity by nurturing remembrance 
and perpetuation of norms. In the first half of the 
hermeneutic circle we see the activities of the socially- 
constituted aspects of the self, and the evidence of the 
impact of community on the identity of the individual.
The second portion of the circle of hermeneutic 
democracy is utilization of perspective gained in the 
discussion of proximate issues to examine foundational 
agreements and their premises. Collective critical self- 
analysis is grounded in the commitment of each citizen to 
evaluate trends in community thinking and the caliber of 
decisions which the polity is making. This part of the 
hermeneutic cycle sustains the vitality of democratic 
processes by averting the potentially detrimental influence
114
of unexamined assumptions and outmoded precedents. While we 
anticipate that some voices will have more influence than 
others, the dynamics of critical self-appraisal ensure that 
deprivileged viewpoints and marginalized interests will 
continue to find their expression. In the activities 
associated with the second half of the hermeneutic circle we 
see the impact of individual citizens on the community, and 
the individuated, autonomous self in action.
In short, I am presenting a hermeneutic model of 
democratic citizenship as founded in Aristotelian thought, 
and endorsing its usefulness as a means of analyzing the 
citizenship debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians. The central axiom of Aristotle's 
hermeneutics is the merit of balance and moderation as 
exemplified by the mean. Specifically, the principle of the 
mean generates symmetry on two axes. First, between the 
theoretical and the practical. Second, between the politics 
of the self and the politics of the community. As a result, 
using this model, we are able to give balanced consideration 
to the concerns of both the individual and the community and 
to maintain conceptual linkage between theory and practice 
in a manner precluded in communitarian and liberal 
individualist models.
In communitarianism, the concept of community is 
reified to the point that it is difficult to grasp, or even 
deduce, a concise notion of what "community" is meant to
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convey. In liberal individualism, this applies to the 
abstracted model of the individual. The self which is 
initially conceived in a presocial context is an idealized 
hypothetical construct which precludes a coherent 
transposition of the individual into society, or 
establishment of a logical point at which to move from the 
realm of theory to practice. Using the principle of the mean 
affords an equilibrium between consideration of theory and 
practice and the individual and the community, making it 
possible to observe and discuss theory and practice, and/or 
the individual and the community without conflating them, or 
giving one half of either pair priority over the other. The 
contrast between this stance, and the effects of antecedence 
for liberal individualism and communitarianism, is clear.
The premises of liberal individualism constantly pull in the 
direction of the importance and options of the individual. 
Similarly, the assumptions of communitarianism push this 
perspective toward an emphasis on the privileges and 
prerogatives of the community.
In a hermeneutic model of democratic citizenship, the 
individual is constituted not only by membership in 
communities, but the community is constituted by its members 
through members' interpretation and understanding of it. 
Hence, the relationship between the individual and the 
community is dynamic and transformational, as opposed to 
static and positional. The individual and the community are
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reciprocally constituted, mutually reinforcing, and the 
relationship between them remains in a state of flux because 
they are continuously influencing, redefining, and thereby 
recasting each other. From the hermeneutic perspective, 
democracy is conceived of as both a means and the end— the 
method and the ideal. In this way, the hermeneutic model of 
democracy establishes a linkage between theory and practice, 
since means and method apply to practical realm, end and 
ideal to the theoretical.
In a hermeneutic view of democratic citizenship, 
citizens are constitutive of the polity. And the converse 
also obtains: the polity is constitutive of the citizens 
because its laws shape behavior, and because of the many 
ways in which the design of its institutions impact the 
proliferation and tenor of associational relationships. In 
addition, the language of democracy has constitutive 
influence. The modes and norms of communication affect the 
manner in which interests are expressed, the formation of 
interests, and the likelihood of conflict resolution.
The impact of language as constitutive of community 
life and political norms is frequently overlooked. Of 
crucial significance to the interactive communication 
associated with democracy are the fundamental premises that 
no subjects are taboo, and that citizen involvement is 
encouraged. In other words, the first norm of democratic 
language is that neither perspectives nor solutions are
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rejected out of hand. This grounding is compatible with the 
principles of democracy, and with hermeneutic epistemology. 
The consequence is epistemological pluralism, meaning that 
the fairness of democratic discourse and the legitimacy of 
th^ decisions it yields are derived directly from its 
inclusiveness. In short, seeing democracy in terms of 
hermeneutic processes affects an enhanced, comprehensive 
understanding of the purposes and consequences of dialogue. 
This is a primary reason for the usefulness of the 
hermeneutic model of democratic discourse in functioning as 
a medium of communication between liberal individualists and 
communitarians.
Aristotle affirms that democratic processes are 
enhanced by seeking the broadening of perspectives which 
results from the political participation of a diverse 
assortment of citizens. The value of moderation is affirmed, 
but so is a mindset of openness to the development of 
innovative options. Moreover, these qualities are desirable 
not only in the self, but also in the arrangement of the 
polity,
...virtue is a mean...and the best life must be 
the middle life, consisting in a mean which is 
open to men of every kind to attain. And the same 
principle must be applicable to the virtue or 
badness of constitutions and states. For the
138 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1295a34; 
the word rendered "constitution" here is politeia. It is worth 
noting the inadequacy of constitution, or any other single English
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Considered in this light, "constitution" connotes both what 
coheres, that is, the politeia. and what facilitates the 
coherence, that is, the citizens.139 A significant point in 
distinguishing the hermeneutic democratic model of 
citizenship from the liberal individualist and communitarian 
models is that virtue is a mean, not an ideal understood in
word, as a translation. Politeia conveys an expansive conception of 
the city encompassing social, political, and economic networks and 
norms— virtually all modes of associative relationships including 
those between the citizens and the polis. "It is a fairly logical 
development that politeia should come to denote the civil community 
and public life. What is harder to explain is why it assumed the 
sense of "constitution"; indeed, at first— and not infrequently 
later— it is used in such a way that it can also be translated 
"citizenry." Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 171. This is not a
case of linguistic sloppiness, or underdevelopment. Attic Greek has 
at least eight words which must all be translated into English as 
"knowledge." The point I would like to emphasize here is the 
conceptual integration of the interests of the citizens with those 
of the polity. Aristotle conveys this in the overt message of this 
passage; it is also strongly suggested when we consider the 
connotations of the language.
139 This reflects a balancing of stances at several levels 
because the mean is not merely an external rule-of-thumb. The mean 
is the epistemological fulcrum as well as the guide for practical 
application. According to Aristotle, individual citizens 
internalize the mean and use it as the foundational methodology for 
self-development and the making of choices. Moreover, the mean can 
be used by citizens as a guide for collective reasoning and 
decision-making. The mean is introduced in the Nicomachean Ethics 
as a method for the making of individual choices: "...[A]ny 
discussion on matters of action cannot be more than an outline and 
is bound to lack precision; for...there are no fixed data in 
matters concerning action and questions of what is
beneficial....And if this is true of our general discussion, our 
treatment of particular problems will be even less precise, since
these do not come under the head of any art which can be
transmitted by precept, but the agent must consider on each 
different occasion what the situation demands...." Aristotle,
Nichomachean Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 1104a.
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absolute terms, but a rather a proximate point of 
balance.140
The context of seeking the mean is indicative of the 
epistemological nature of political knowledge in the 
hermeneutic model: the mean is not used with an absolute and 
moralistic conception of virtue as the referent. So in 
reference to what is the mean moderate? The mean is the 
point of moderation "relative to us."141 Humans in the 
collective sense of the political community are the
140 "We are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what 
virtue is, but in order to become good, else there would be no 
advantage in studying it." Ibid., 1103b. This reflects Aristotle's 
interest in immanent guidelines for personal development and 
positive self-transformation. The mean is an immanent guideline, 
not an elusive target or an absolute, transcendent ideal, (as, for 
example, "virtue" becomes in the schema of Alisdair MacIntyre). 
Using the principle of the mean indicates locating the path of 
moderation and equilibrium, whenever possible, from among available 
and feasible options. Aristotle acknowledges that finding a mean is 
not possible in every instance. What he emphasizes is the benefit 
of an mindset which avoids extremes: "Not every action nor every
emotion admits of a mean." Ibid., 1107a; "The first concern of a 
man who aims at the medium should, therefore, be to avoid the
extreme...." Ibid., 1109a.
141 "We may thus conclude that virtue or excellence is a
characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing 
the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational 
principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use...." Ibid., 
1106b. The mean is flexible, not guided universalistic premises. To 
explicate this Aristotle compares how the mean operates in contrast 
to strict adherence to written laws: "...[A]11 law is universal,
but there are some things about which is it is not possible to 
speak correctly in universal terms....And this is the very nature 
of the equitable, a rectification of law where law falls short be 
reason of its universality... For where a thing is indefinite, the 
rule by which it is measured is also indefinite...so a decree is
adapted to a given situation." Ibid., 1137b.
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reference point.142 What is right and true, is so with 
regard to the citizens because we are the ones on whom the 
implementation of decisions have bearing. This also reflects 
the hermeneutic perspective on the nature of democracy 
because the interests of citizens are the sole reference 
point of justification and legitimacy. As a result, 
determinations are made and political authority is justified 
without appealing to rationality, absolute truths, or self- 
evident "facts." The Aristotelian model of hermeneutic 
democracy is person-centered as well as community-centered. 
Observations and suggestions are made in the context of the 
feasible and accessible with regard to particular 
individuals and an actual community, rather than, (as with 
communitarians and liberal individualists), by appeal to 
reified notions of the community or the individual.
142 The perspective we find here on the capacity of humans to 
gain political wisdom and the immanent nature of political 
knowledge is reflective of a number of texts produced in fifth and 
fourth century Athens. The Homeric tradition and its legacy in the 
dramatic and philosophical works of democratic Athens are consonant 
with what we find in Aristotle. One familiar example: "Numberless 
are the world's wonders, but none more wonderful than man....Words 
also, and thought as rapid as air, he fashions to his good use; 
statecraft is his....O clear intelligence, force beyond all 
measure...." Sophocles, "Antigone," (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1977) , Scene I, Ode I. Also, "Man is the measure of all 
things." Plato, "Theaetetus" 16 Ode, in The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations, ed. Angela Partington (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 530.
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The Democratic Self as a Mean
Let us examine the sense in which the self of the 
hermeneutic model is both socially-constituted and 
autonomous. In Aristotle we find the socially-constituted 
self and the autonomous individual integrated in the 
democratic citizen—  probably the most pivotal observation 
on the social disposition of the self is that "man is by 
nature a political animal."143 The conception of 
"political" here is quite broad. "Political" is a 
transliteration indicating that having to do with the 
polis.144 In Aristotle's perspective the socially- 
constituted and autonomous aspects of the self are not 
contradictory, are rather features of a multi-faceted but 
integrated self functioning in a democratic polity. The 
Aristotelian perspective of the democratic citizen reflects
143 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1253al.
Several passages from Aristotle illustrate the sense in which the 
self is depicted as socially-constituted. These can be, and have 
been, cited in such a way as to establish an association between 
Aristotle and communitarians. Upon closer inspection we will see 
that this interpretation is skewed since it only tells half the 
story.
144 Politikon zoon may be rendered as: "A being whose nature it 
is to live in a polis." Please see Aristotle, The Politics (London: 
Penguin, 1962), 1253al and 1253a7, and accompanying translation
note by Trevor J. Saunders. This picture of the human also appears 
in the Nichomachean Ethics, and is, perhaps, clearer in that 
version: "...[M]an who lives with parents, children, a wife, and
friends and fellow citizens, since man is by nature a social and 
political being." Aristotle, Nichomachaen Ethics (New York: 
MacMillan, 1962), 1097b; please see also, Ibid., 1297b. Martin
Otswald points out: "The term polis covers our concept 'society'
(for which the Greeks had no independent word), and politike is the 
science of society as well as the science of the state." Martin 
Otswald, translator and editor, Ibid., 313.
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characteristic moderation and symmetry: the identity of the 
self is a balanced combination of socially-contingent and 
autonomous factors. The democratic self of Aristotle can 
serve as a mean in the debate between liberal individualists 
and communitarians because Aristotle models an individual in 
which the politics of the self incorporate both facets of 
the hermeneutic circle.
Each of the facets of the self upholds and explains the 
functioning of a corresponding half of the hermeneutic 
circle. The socially-constituted aspects of the self 
acknowledge the impact of the communal environment in 
identity formation, and are cognizant of the commonality of 
shared understandings. This self is the citizen when he/she 
is inclined to participate in public discourse and 
collective reasoning, as well as activities which build or 
celebrate the bonds of common membership. The socially- 
constituted self corresponds to the first half of the 
hermeneutic circle. The autonomous and individuated aspects 
of the self appreciate the diversity among individuals that 
is validated by the uniqueness of each, and the many ways in 
which personal choices have impacted identity and individual 
self-understanding. The individuated self as the citizen is 
inclined to engage in individual reflection especially with 
regard to the assessment of the premises and consensuses 
which seem to be guiding the day-to-day decisions of the 
polity. The autonomous facets of the self correspond to the
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self as a citizen taking a role in the second half of the 
hermeneutic circle.
The model of hermeneutic processes articulated by 
Aristotle reflects a distinctive view of the sources and 
purposes of agreement in the citizen body, and one which 
speaks to the concerns of both communitarians and liberal 
individualists. Aristotle observes, "[H]umans...have 
perception of good and evil, just and unjust. It is the 
sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a 
household and a state."145 Such assumptions can be linked 
to liberal individualists as well as to communitarians. 
Liberal individualists argue repeatedly that consensus on 
fundamental issues is the foundation of socio-political 
relations.146 What distinguishes the views of liberal
145 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1253a7.
146 For example, Gutmann, Dahl and Dworkin, appeal to the 
existence of agreement on basic principles which can function as 
the moral foundation and fundament consensus crucial to the 
establishment of political institutions: "...the basis of the most 
common solution to the problem of moral conflict in a pluralist 
society, is that citizens can still agree on principle...higher- 
order principles that are intended to transcend disagreement on 
specific policies...." Amy Gutmann, Ethics 101, (October 1990): 64. 
"For even though a democratic country cannot possibly eliminate 
political conflicts over particular issues, a country's fundamental 
regulative principles and structure might receive such widespread 
support as to survive particular controversies." Robert A. Dahl, 
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982) , 161; also, "Polyarchy is a function of consensus on
the... norms...." Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 76. "The liberal,
therefore, needs a scheme of civil rights, whose effect will be to 
determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to 
reflect strong external preferences...." Ronald Dworkin, 
"Liberalism," in Public and Private Morality, ed. Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge, Eng: Camgbridge University Press, 1978), 134.
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individualists on this point is that reason, or some 
permutation of self-evident truth, is the source of 
foundational consensus. For communitarians, the sharing of 
ascribed attributes are the basis of collective values. In 
the hermeneutic model, public discourse energizes a fluid 
and dynamic public discourse, which in turn yields workable 
agreements on both immanent and fundamental issues.
The relevant point here is that consensus for liberal 
individualists, and shared understandings for 
communitarians, fulfill parallel purposes. For 
communitarians, the community itself, as the vehicle for 
understanding norms and traditions, is the source of shared 
understandings. It is on the source of consensus and shared 
understandings that liberal individualists and 
communitarians disagree. The hermeneutic perspective 
democratic citizenship is clearly distinct from the other 
two models on the nature, source, and function of basic 
agreement. Aristotle refers to the "sharing of common views" 
in the context of the polis1 ability to make judgments on 
everyday issues. The context of this section is a discussion 
of the polis as an association which includes the analogy 
that useful is to just as harmful is to unjust. The 
immanence of this perspective is illustrated in that the 
unjust is unjust because it is harmful, and the just is just
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because it is useful.147 Once again, harmful and useful are 
gauged using citizens' perception of their proximate 
interests as the referent. The hermeneutic model of 
democratic citizenship emphasizes the doable and the 
tangible over the ideological and the abstract.
The significance of humans as the reference point is 
further underscored by remembering that the hermeneutic self 
is neither an idealized nor reified self. With regard to the 
self, Aristotle remarks that speech, not intelligence, is 
the distinguishing feature of humans, because it permits the 
articulate expression of ideas.148 Although intelligence is 
the means of theoretical reasoning, only (some form of) 
speech makes the transmission of any idea, whether concrete 
or abstract, possible. This stance is concordant with the 
epistemological perspective of the polity in the hermeneutic 
model. The polis is not founded on, nor does it justify its 
existence on, the basis of revealed or transcendent truth. 
The conceptual grounding of the city is the perspectives, 
discourse, and decisions of the citizens. Within this 
framework citizens have the latitude to construe "the good
147 "Speech. . .serves to indicate what is useful and what is 
harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real 
difference between humans and other animals is that humans alone 
have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. It is a 
sharing of a common view in these matters that makes a household 




life" in a variety of ways.149
For Aristotle, excellence of character cannot be 
generalized across the citizen body because individuals 
differ in function and opinion, "a state is made up of these 
and many other sorts of people besides, all different. The 
virtue of all the citizens cannot, therefore, be 
one...."150 This statement is all the more significant 
considered in light of Aristotle's emphasis on virtue and 
excellence of character. Citizens may be more inclined to 
agree on fundamental but abstract issues such as good and 
evil, justice and injustice. These foundational areas of 
concord facilitate the functioning of the first half of the 
hermeneutic circle. At the same time, Aristotle recognizes a 
broad diversity of beliefs on pivotal foundational political 
questions such as what the state is, and what constitutes a 
citizen. This plurality of ideas promotes the processes of 
the second half of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic 
approach does not seek to transcend political conflict 
because it affirms the legitimacy of the contestability of
149 This point also undermines the linkage between Aristotle
and communitarians. As we have observed, Aristotelian teleology in 
the context of the good life is grounded in the citizens' view of 
their collective self-interest as a reference point, rather than a 
transcendent or universal perspective on "the good." This is the 
context of the observation that, "[W]hile the state came about as 
a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure 
the good life." Ibid., 1252b27.
150 Ibid. , 1277a5 .
127
such issues.151
To communitarians, communities provide citizens with 
the context for forming and acting on collectively 
determined concepts of the good. Once again we find an 
epistemological equilibrium because these concepts of the 
good are also of constitutive significance to the community. 
"Good" in these terms may be "good for" in an Aristotelian 
sense, or "the good," in a Platonic sense. From an 
Aristotelian perspective the community is viewed 
teleologically: the community is good for helping citizens 
to achieve their collective and individual aims (that is, 
their telos). Therefore, the community is the means to the 
end. From a Platonic standpoint, a properly arranged 
community is good in itself, and is consequently an end in 
itself. In either case, the content and focus of citizens' 
concepts of the good are inherently social. The universal 
and transcendent notions of the good which are produced by 
the antecedence of the individual or the community, 
respectively, are simply absent from the hermeneutic model.
151 "In considering the varieties and characteristics of 
constitutions, we must begin by looking at the state and asking 
what it is. There is no unanimity about this....So also we must 
ask, Who is a citizen? and, Whom should we call one? Here too there 
is no unanimity, no agreement as to what constitutes a citizen...." 
Ibid., 1274b32-1275a2. "The state consists not merely of a 
plurality of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a 
state out of men who are all alike." Ibid., 1261a22. Aristotle's 
tongue-in-cheek critique of the level of unity advocated by Plato 
also illustrates this point, "...it may be an admirable state of 
affairs where 'all1 say the same thing, it is nevertheless 
impossible." Ibid., 1261bl6. Aristotle is here referring to Plato, 
The Republic, 462c.
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A Hermeneutic Model of Citizenship as a Mean Between Liberal 
Individualism and Communitarianism
At the most fundamental level, Aristotle's polity 
exhibits the mean in a balance between concern for the 
individual and concern for the political community. In the 
current debate between communitarians and liberal 
individualists, Aristotle therefore provides not simply an 
alternative, but a middle ground. The hermeneutic approach 
precludes the constraints of the dualism which is so 
pervasive in the debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians. When a hermeneutic model is applied to the 
issue of the self as citizen, the mean connotes balance in 
the symmetry between the politics of the self and the 
politics of the community.
As we might expect, citizenship is central in the 
Aristotelian schema. Citizenship is a significant context 
for the interdependent functioning of the socially- 
constituted and individuated aspects of the self. Virtually 
all discussion of humans in the collective sense, in The 
Politics. centers on the characteristics of citizens and 
their public/political activities.152 In answering the 
question of "what constitutes a citizen," Aristotle focuses 
on the requirement that a citizen be capable of functioning 
in two alternating roles, "...the virtue of a citizen of
152 Although this is a central theme throughout, the individual 
in the public sphere is explicated in Book III of The Politics, 
when Aristotle poses the question, "what constitutes a citizen?". 
Ibid., 1274b32.
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repute seems to be just this— to be able to rule and be 
ruled well."153 The tendency to distinguish between leaders 
and led is deemphasized by the certainty that each citizen 
will both rule and be ruled at various times. This discounts 
the common distinction between the rulers and the ruled, as 
well as reducing the grounds for differentiation on the 
basis of expertise or authority between the speaker and 
audience in political discourse.154
The dialectics involved with communicative interaction 
in this format create the milieu for egalitarian dialogue. 
Analyses of the documented ordinances regarding leadership 
and debate in the Athenian polis provide an-historical means 
of visualizing the terms of democratic political discourse, 
where both sides of the hermeneutic circle are in 
evidence.155 What we find in Aristotle is insight into the 
ideological substructure of the statutes which governed 
public discussion. This is, in a sense, more fundamental in 
that it informs us of the attitudes and norms that resulted 
in the codification of rules for office holding and public
153 Ibid. , 1277a25 .
154 A citizen speaking in the Assembly may be one who is being 
ruled, just as easily as one who is ruling. Moreover, even if a 
speaker is an elected official or a person filling a position 
determined by lot, the position filled is one which a variety of 
citizens have held and will hold.
155 Outstanding examples here include Christian Meier, The 
Greek Discovery of Politics, Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in 




The hermeneutic model of the self incorporates the
dynamics of a citizen body which validates and examines
fundamental areas of consensus in the polity. Public
discourse builds on and questions shared understandings.
Foundational areas of agreement are not grounded in a
utopian view of the self, or a mystical understanding of
community. Rather, the hermeneutic aspects of democratic
functioning tend to recast citizen's interests in the
direction of consensus. Communicative interaction not only
reveals preferences but molds and shape them,
For even where there are many people, each has 
some share of virtue and practical wisdom; and 
when they are brought together... so also do they 
become one in regard to character and 
intelligence.156
This illustrates an intrinsic good of hermeneutic democracy: 
it creates a context in which citizens will expect to be 
influenced positively by fellow citizens.
Accordingly, the source of citizens' respect for 
decisions made in a democratic manner is not the rightness 
of written laws, but the reciprocal nature of public 
discourse.157 While the democratic citizen engages in 
autonomous reflection, he/she also retains an attitude of 
flexibility regarding his/her own inclinations,
156 Ibid., 1281a39.
157 "For the equitable is held to be right, and equity is right 
going beyond written law." Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (London: 
Penguin, 1991), 1374a.
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Deliberation operates in matters...whose outcome 
is unpredictable, and in cases in which an 
indeterminate element is involved. When great 
issues are at stake, we distrust our own abilities 
as insufficient to decide the matter and call on 
others to join us in our deliberations.158
The hermeneutic processes of Aristotelian democracy nurture
the capacity for individual citizens to be persuaded by
other members of the polity.159 Unlike communitarianism
which depicts amicable relations between citizens on the
bases of hereditary characteristics, the hermeneutic model
explains the collegial features of community as being the
consequence of citizens' involvement in both halves of the
hermeneutic processes.
Once again we note a contrast with the liberal
individualist approach where interests are communicated
through the relatively private act of voting, and with the
communitarian notion which presupposes consensus based on
common membership. In hermeneutic democracy, public
discourse is the framework for the disclosure of
preferences. Consequently, the aggregation of opinions and
interests does not take place in a vacuum, but neither is
agreement assumed. Because interest aggregation is carried
out through collective dialogue and deliberation,
158 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 
1112b.
159 "For while opinion is no longer a process of investigation 
but has reached the point of affirmation, a person who 
deliberates... is still engaged in investigating and calculating 
something not yet determined." Ibid., 1142b.
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preferences are impacted. The influence of public debate is, 
for individual citizens, a deeper understanding of 
alternative viewpoints, and for the political community, a 
more fully informed consensus.
As we have seen, Aristotle does not entertain an 
idealized notion of the self, nor does he make fantastic 
claims as to the expected capacities of democratic citizens. 
Nevertheless, we find an expectation that the citizen body 
will make good decisions. The oolitikon zoon. is a citizen 
who, in concert with other citizens, makes the best possible 
choices on public matters, M...[E]ach individual will indeed 
be a worse judge than the experts, but collectively they 
will be better, or at any rate no worse."160
On what grounds does Aristotle expect the political 
community to abide by policy choices made in a collective 
manner? The answer here is twofold. The first explanation is 
what we have just outlined: the attitude of the citizens is 
such that they will expect democratic discourse to produce 
appropriate decisions. The legitimacy and authority of such 
determinations are based on the inclusiveness of public 
discourse and the "collective wisdom" of the citizenry. The 
second defense for this claim is the influence of democratic 
education.161 Education in the Aristotelian schema refers
160 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), 1282al4.
161 "...[A] state is a plurality, which must depend on 
education to bring about its common unity." Aristotle, The 
Politics, 1263b29. "In matters that belong to the public, training
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to childhood education in the sense of instruction, as well 
as to the educative benefits of democratic 
participation.162
With regard to questions of structural and 
institutional balance, the hermeneutic model indicates that 
equilibrium is achieved by the mixing of regimes.163 For 
Aristotle, politeia is context-specific, reflecting a
for them must be the public's concern. Ibid., 1337all. For 
Aristotle's discussion of this please see Book VII of The Politics, 
particularly chapters i and ii. The importance of public education 
on the topic of citizenship in democracies is, of course, a current 
topic. Please see, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, An Aristocracy 
of Everyone: The Politics of Education and the Future of America 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and 
Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991); Eric B. Gorham, National Service. 
Citizenship, and Political Education (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991); Amy Gutmann, "Undemocratic Education," in 
Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 71-88; Carole Pateman,
Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, ENG: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), especially Chapter 2 and Conclusion; 
Michael Walzer, "The Civil Society Argument," in Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1992) .
162 "...[P]ractical wisdom deals with particular facts...is 
common to both kinds, (i.e. practical and political wisdom), and is 
concerned with action and deliberation." Aristotle, Nichomachean 
Ethics (New York: MacMillan, 1962), 1141b. "Practical wisdom is 
concerned with particulars... and knowledge of particulars comes 
from experience." Ibid., 1142a. Also, please see Aristotle, The 
Politics (London: Penguin, 1962), VUI.i-iii.
163 Please see Aristotle, The Politics. Ill.vii and IV.ix. The 
organizational schema which Aristotle advocates for the polity is 
not, strictly speaking, democracy, but politeia. because it is a 
more balanced form. In the six cell matrix, politeia denotes rule 
by the many in the interest of the many, (whereas democracy denotes 
rule by the poor in their own interest). Unfortunately, we use the 
word democracy to describe what Aristotle meant by politeia. losing 
the capacity to distinguish between the original meaning (except by 
resort to unwieldy descriptions of class-based and/or economically- 
determined interests) .
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combination of the three right forms of government in a 
manner appropriate to a specific political community.164 In 
contrast to the particularism and moderation of the 
hermeneutic model, liberal individualism and 
communitarianism reflect asymmetry in the relationship 
between the individual citizen and the polity, in matters of 
priority and precedence.
The liberal individualist premise of the antecedence of 
the individual combined with the probability that the state 
could use its power to violate individual rights means that 
allocation of power becomes the essential function of 
politics. Moreover, this allocation incorporates the 
potential for coercion, especially because power is scarce, 
and trade-offs are zero-sum.165 We have noted in the
164 Please see Ibid., IV.ii and IV.xi. Although Athens is 
central in Aristotle's observations, his interest in the written 
constitutions and political practices of other poleis is quite 
apparent. Perhaps Aristotle's own status facilitated his ability to 
gain some detachment by which to make the comparative observations 
we have in The Politics. Aristotle was from Stageira in Macedonia, 
and resided in Athens at various points in his life as a resident 
alien. Please see Introduction by T. A. Sinclair in ibid.
165 One of the concerns expressed by liberal individualists 
over the implications of communitarianism is the potential for the 
emphasis on community to evolve, (in terms of practical policy), 
into a relative loss of power of individual citizens. Examples of 
this include Sartori who writes: "In the city-communities of
antiquity, liberty was not expressed through opposition to state 
power— for there was no state— but through participation in the 
collective exercise of power. But once we have a state that is 
distinct from and ordained over, society, the problem is reversed, 
and a power of the people can only be a power taken away from the 
state." Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited 
(Chatham: Chatham House, 1987), 291. Richard Arneson inquires
whether power trade-offs between individuals and the state are 
zero-sum, or in practical terms, does augmentation of a sense of
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hermeneutic model a balancing of the allocation of power 
between the citizens and the nation-state, without 
presupposing that this is a zero-sum trade-off. The rules of 
Pareto optimality do not apply because of the manner in 
which the interests of the city and the citizens are 
integrated. The language of hermeneutic democracy does not 
set up a conflict of interests between the individual and 
the community, as do liberal individualists. But neither 
does hermeneutic democracy finesse the issue of political 
conflict, as communitarians do by presupposing unity 
resulting from common membership. In the hermeneutic model, 
that which benefits the individual citizen will also benefit 
the whole, and vice versa. Pursuing the welfare of the 
citizen and the polity is one endeavor, obviating the 
likelihood of power struggles between the citizens and the 
collectivity.
In the hermeneutic model, citizens do not see their 
interests as being separate from, much less contradictory
community and the actual prerogatives of community result in a 
decrease of the power and choices of individuals? Please see 
Richard J. Arneson, "Liberal Democratic Community," in Democratic 
Community. eds. John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York 
University Press, 1993), 191-95. From a communitarian standpoint, 
Thomas Moody charges that liberal individualists are inextricably 
trapped by the constraints of Pareto optimality, "To see the issue 
as the individual 'versus' the society is to endorse a particular 
Hobbesian-liberal world view about the relationship between 
individuals and their societies. It is to endorse the belief that 
this relationship must be a zero-sum game where what one party 
gains the other loses." Thomas Moody, "Liberalism and an Eccentric 
Communitarianism," in The Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate, ed. 
C.F. Delaney (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1994), 98.
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to, those of the polis. The distinguishing feature of the 
hermeneutic model here is that integration of public and 
private interests is not effected by an idealized depiction 
of human nature.166 For Aristotle, the merging of the 
interests of the citizens with those of the polis is a 
fragile and dynamic consolidation continuously nourished 
through the dialectics of public discourse and citizen 
participation. The practical prescriptives which advocate 
communicative interaction between the citizens, facilitate 
the balancing of the respective values of theory and 
practice, speech and action, the letter of the law and the 
spirit of the law, and the interests of citizens and those 
of the polity.
One of the impediments to communication between liberal 
individualists and communitarians is a preoccupation with 
rights. Liberal individualists are concerned with individual 
rights and communitarians with the rights of the community. 
The view of democratic citizenship expounded by Aristotle 
has much to offer in this regard. The Aristotelian 
perspective disaggregates the concept of rights, 
demonstrating instead a concern with the issues of 
citizenship, human fulfillment, the socio-political
166 For examples of perspectives where such a union of the 
interests of the individual citizens with those of the community is 
based on an idealized view of both individual and polity, please 
see, Alisdair MacIntyre, "The Privatization of Good," in The 
Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate. ed. C.F. Delaney (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994); also, Leo Strauss, 
The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), 93-113.
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community, and the relationship between the individual and 
the city-state.
The pertinent distinction here between Aristotelian 
hermeneutics and both communitarianism and liberal 
individualism is not an absence of the language of rights, 
but that the individual and the polis are not considered 
separately. They are not evaluated on different bases, and 
neither takes precedence over the other. For our discussion 
of citizenship, this means that neither the individual nor 
the polis could be of primary, or secondary importance. 
Therefore decisions regarding membership take into 
consideration what is optimal for both citizens and 
community. While acknowledging that the individual and the 
polity are distinct, the model of the self does not place 
the individual at odds with the polity, (as with liberal 
individualism), and the model of the polity does not place 
it at odds with the individuality of citizens, (as with 
communitarians). Simply put, the actual connection between 
collective and individual welfare is the reason for the 
theoretic bond between the citizen and the polity. In a 
hermeneutic theory of democratic citizenship based on 
Aristotle's perspective, theory itself is pragmatically 
grounded, being built on practical observations rather than 
hypothetical constructs and thought experiments.
In The Politics for example, the bond between the 
individual and the polis is both the context of establishing
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conceptual foundations and framing everyday issues.
Moreover, this approach is entirely consistent with an 
understanding of the human as a politikon zoon. and the 
polis as a composite organism. The polity is an organic 
whole made up of citizens. Practically speaking, the 
association of citizens constitutes the polis. With regard 
to epistemology, the same association exists on the 
perceptual level between the citizens and the state. The 
aggregated preferences and collective decisions of the 
citizens are the interests and actions of the polis. 
Interpreting this observation as an assertion that the 
interests of the polity are more important than those of 
individuals is to view it through a lens of modernity that 
distorts it considerably. As we have observed, in 
Aristotle1s schema the importance of the interests of the 
state relative to those of citizens is a moot point. The 
phrase "democratic state" could be considered a 
contradiction in terms because the fundamental 
characteristic of the democracy, (that is, politeia), is 
that it is stateless.167
A modern interpretation which equates antecedence with 
precedence suffers from the effects of the dualism which
167 This point is made by Giovanni Sartori in The Theory of 
Democracy Revisited. 278-80. Indeed, Aristotle describes the 
authority of the citizenry in such a way: "For the people have made 
themselves masters of everything and administer everything through 
decrees of the Assembly and decisions of the law courts, in which 
they hold the power." Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens (New 
York: MacMillan, 1974), 41.2.
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tends to force observations and conclusions toward polarized 
or even extreme positions. Aristotle's adherence to the 
principle of the mean has a moderating effect generally lost 
on contemporary audiences. The approach found in Aristotle 
integrates and balances components which modern thought 
tends to view as competing or mutually exclusive. As we have 
seen, interests of citizens and of the state are not viewed 
separately from a hermeneutic standpoint. In addition, the 
politeia, (what I refer to as democracy), is advocated as 
optimal, not in terms of being a distinct form, but because 
it combines and integrates the desirable characteristics of 
other regime types.168
Citizens in each of the three models under 
consideration are undoubtedly impacted by the type of 
political community to which they belong. Lines indicating 
the direction of influence between citizens and the polity 
must be drawn in both directions because not only do
individuals determine the arrangement of the polity, but the
characteristics of the polity shape the expectations and 
behaviors of citizens. In hermeneutic theory, the 
description of the public and political self, that is, the 
citizen, is associated with democracy as the corresponding
168 mphere must therefore be as many constitutions as there are 
arrangements of the superiorities and differences between parts. 
But they are commonly reckoned to be two...democracy and
oligarchy.... But our own classification is better, as well as more 
accurate, because the well-formed constitutions are...the
harmonious and well-balanced mixture." Aristotle, The Politics 
(London: Penguin, 1962), 1290a3-1290al3.
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regime type,
A citizen will necessarily vary according to the 
constitution in each case. For this reason, our 
definition of citizen is best applied in a 
democracy. ...169
We have noted that the relationship between citizens 
and the liberal individualist state are the likely to be 
adversarial. The reasons for this are evident. First, the 
state is required to adjudicate the conflicts that arise 
from individuals' pursuit of their personal objectives under 
the condition of scarcity. Second, the state is cast in two 
conflicting roles: it is assigned to protect the freedom 
necessary for the exercise of personal liberty, while it is
also the most likely assailant of this preeminent right.
These tensions put liberal individualists in the 
position of explaining how the propensity for discord 
between citizens and the state can be minimized. One common 
solution is to dilute the influence and involvement of 
citizens by strengthening institutions and the prerogatives 
of political officials. Cooperative relations between 
citizens and the state are promoted by encouraging citizens 
to leave ruling to the leaders, while citizens remain free 
to pursue their social and economic interests privately.170
169 Ibid., 1275a34-1275b5.
170 Among the most popular versions of this perspective: "First 
of all, according to the view we have taken, democracy does not
mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the
terms 'people' and 'rule.' Democracy means only that the people 
have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to 
rule them." Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and
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This approach avoids dealing with alienation between 
citizens and the state, but still accentuates the sources of 
the rift since it makes the state appear even more distant 
and domineering. By contrast, our analysis suggests that 
strengthening the hermeneutic and discursive aspects of 
democracy by preventing a rift between citizens and polity.
There is a corresponding imbalance in the communitarian 
model of citizenship. The foundation of the communitarian 
polity is shared ascribed attributes which ostensibly 
produce solidarity and common interests. However, this 
places the community in an awkward position. The only means 
of evaluating citizens is their continuing agreement with 
the community*s traditional premises. A good citizen is one 
who accedes to the traditional premises of his/her 
community. We are once again faced with a problem arising 
from ambiguity among communitarians regarding leadership.
Who is entrusted with definitively interpreting fundamental 
shared understandings? Bonds based on non-elective 
characteristics are the foundation of the political 
community, but communitarians do not specify the limits of 
political authority or the means of reestablishing these 
bonds.
The result is the possibility that concerns regarding 
solidarity could be "manipulated ideologically to produce a
Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), 284-85.
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sentiment of commonality,"171 even when there are 
legitimate conflicts arising from a variety of other 
interests.172 The negative potential is that community 
leaders could attempt to strengthen internal cohesion by 
emphasizing differences between those within and outsiders. 
Communitarianism leaves open the threat that influential 
individuals may reinforce solidarity among members with 
contentious rhetoric, or even through actions designed to 
foment conflict with nonmembers. As history and current 
events indicate, this produces a negative and hollow 
political agenda based in exaggerated differentiation and 
truculent posturing.
171 Mark Warren observes the potential for communitarian 
premises to be used to orchestrate an artificial form of consensus, 
"This is where communitarians are often culpable, and this is why 
expansive democrats insist that self-transformation in the 
direction of commonality must occur through democratic dialogue—  
the context in which ideologically manipulated commonality is least 
likely to survive." Mark Warren, "Democratic Theory and Self 
Transformation," American Political Science Review. 86 (March 
1992), 21.
172 If the communitarian emphasis on the human need for 
belonging and solidarity is combined with nationalism, the result 
could be an ideological grounding for a virulent form of right-wing 
authoritarianism. Possible negative repercussions of the 
combination of communitarianism and nationalism are under 
discussion by those who study resurgent ethnic nationalism. On this 
topic, please see Benedict, Imagined Communities; Walker Connor, 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994); Jaskeet S. Sekhon, "Nationalism, Racism 
and Communitarianism," Paper presented at the 1994 annual 
conference of the American Political Science Association, New York; 
Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New 
Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993).
Conclusion
The project undertaken here has been to show how a 
hermeneutic model of democracy and citizenship can serve as 
a medium of communication in the debate between liberal 
individualists and communitarians. Hermeneutic theory 
facilitates substantive communication between the 
perspectives of liberal individualists and communitarians by 
drawing out implications of the emphasis they each place on 
significant facets of democracy. At the foundational level, 
a hermeneutic approach integrates the socially-constituted 
and individualistic aspects of the self in a manner which 
indicates that they are not mutually exclusive and that 
neither merits a position of antecedence relative to the 
other. As a result, hermeneutic theory offers to liberal 
individualists and communitarians the means of moderating 
intractable premises regarding the self and enhancing the 
democratic facets of citizen activity evident in each of the 
models. Finally, hermeneutic democracy renders a theory of 
citizenship which stands out as a balanced and conciliatory 
alternative in the debate between liberal individualists and 
communitarians.
The hermeneutic model conceives of democracy as a two- 
sided process, where the first half sees shared
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understandings and culture as constituting the individual, 
and the second half sees individuals, in all their 
diversity, as constituting the matrix of shared culture and 
understandings. This perspective is grounded in processes 
which reinforce both halves of the hermeneutic circle. The 
first half consists of citizens, as a body, using shared 
understandings to gain perspective and make judgments on 
proximate issues. In the second half, citizens as individual 
deliberators engage in analytical evaluation of the polity, 
and reevaluation of areas of consensus and the quality of 
decisions. The hermeneutic theory of democracy also 
maintains a symmetry between the politics of the democratic 
self and the politics of the democratic community by 
balancing consideration of individual citizens vis a vis the 
polity, based on conceptual equilibrium between a self that 
is socially-constituted while also an autonomous agent.
From the vantage point of hermeneutic theory, unity, 
conformity of belief, and intellectual homogeneity, like 
democracy itself, are all matters of degree. Following the 
mean by keeping a balance in expectations and in the pursuit 
of these characteristics is of the essence. From descriptive 
as well as normative standpoints, shared understandings do 
not produce the collectivism found in communitarianism. 
Rather, the equilibrium of hermeneutic theory suggests how 
an heterogeneous body of citizens are capable of functioning 
in concert. While immoderate individuation, both in ideas
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and practice, suggests undesirable fragmentation, overdrawn 
endorsements of solidarity yield unfounded expectations and 
exaggerated visions of unity.
The democratic citizen in Aristotelian thought is one 
who is autonomous yet social, capable of articulating self- 
interest yet involved in a network of different social 
relationships, aware of personal and private needs but 
inclined to weigh heavily what he/she perceives to be the 
good of the collectivity. In short, the democratic citizen 
has diverse roles and, of equal importance, many contexts of 
fulfillment. The multi-faceted identity of the democratic 
self yields a concept of interest more elaborate than that 
which appears in either liberal individualism or 
communitarianism. The hermeneutic model of the self is 
depicted in the framework of varying capacities, interests, 
relationships, and spheres of fulfillment.
In comparing the hermeneutic model of citizenship 
derived from Aristotle with those of liberal individualists 
and communitarians we see that by beginning with constrained 
conceptions of the self, the latter two become bound to 
specific expectations of behavior, and therefore to certain 
social structures and political institutions. If the 
individuation of citizens is based on the notion that their 
primary interests are prepolitical, the society and 
institutions which such persons create will be designed to 
deal with atomistic functioning and conflict resolution. By
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the same token, if the community of origin is conceived as 
constitutive of the individual on the basis of ascribed 
attributes, a level of consensus and harmony will be assumed 
which is superficial because it ignores the contingencies of 
disagreements that result from valid differences in 
convictions and choices.
I have argued that the hermeneutic model of democracy 
and democratic citizenship grounded in Aristotle is useful 
in many respects. Obviously, contemporary states present 
dilemmas which must be addressed. The complexity and size of 
modern states tend to remove them from discourse and direct 
contact with citizens. Under these circumstances, the 
likelihood for prospective policy to be perceived in terms 
of a power trade-off between state and citizens increases 
dramatically. In the debate between liberal individualists 
and communitarians these concerns appear as disputes over 
the relative importance of individual rights and community 
rights. Will either set of rights be violated, and will the 
potential good that could be accomplished by implementation 
of a prospective policy outweigh the damage done by any 
abridgement of rights? The language of hermeneutic democracy 
once again serves as a medium of communication here by 
disaggregating the concept of rights, reducing the tendency 
toward polarization, and advancing a more multifarious 
approach to the conceptualization of democracy and the
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actual process of democratization.173
In addition to clarifying the issues which divide 
liberal individualists and communitarians, examining a 
hermeneutic model of democratic processes provides an 
accessible version of democratic theory. The hermeneutic 
model of democracy incorporates a flexibility and 
particularism in its fundamental perspective which results 
in a transportable and widely-applicable approach. The 
benefits are significant: the hermeneutic model of democracy 
provides a cross-cultural and transnational model of 
democratic citizenship which does not consider democracy a 
static or monomorphic type, but rather emphasizes the 
essential aspects of democracy in a manner which remains 
sensitive to the broader contexts of specific conditions. 
Understanding ways of implementing democracy, and 
impediments to democracy, has become even more valuable in 
the wake of the cold war. A global increase in the 
proportion of democracies, and widespread efforts toward 
further democratization make this clear.
173 Among others, James Fishkin, Michael Walzer, William 
Sullivan, Jean Cohen and Carole Pateman propose ways of 
reconceptualizing democracy and respiriting democratization within 
the large scale nation-state. While acknowledging the undemocratic 
implications of the unwieldy state, Cohen and Pateman propose that 
the project of democratization be approached by furthering 
democratic rules, and practices (especially participation), within 
a variety of spheres. This includes realms which are social and 
economic as well as those which are overtly political. In Cohen's 
schema the aim is a "plurality of democracies." Please see Jean 
Cohen, "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society," Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 14 (1988): 315-37; also, Carole Pateman, Participation
and Democratic Theory.
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A hermeneutic approach affords the context for a 
substantive dialogue between liberal individualists and 
communitarians because of its ability to communicate on 
common ground with each of the other two perspectives. 
Critiquing the dissension between liberal individualists and 
communitarians from this standpoint indicates the following. 
Constrained by the model of the socially-constituted self 
and the emphasis on shared understandings, communitarians 
prioritize the first phase of hermeneutic democracy, while 
neglecting the second. Motivated by the individuated model 
of the self and the assumption of a citizen body with a 
plethora of diverse individual opinions, liberal 
individualists stress the second phase of hermeneutic 
democracy, to the detriment of the first. Communitarians and 
liberal individualists each portray a fragmented half of the 
hermeneutic circle, inert as a result of having been 
disengaged from the other. The hermeneutic model 
characterizes democracy as an ongoing cycle of immanent 
processes.
Communitarians accentuate the importance of using 
shared understandings as a foundation from which to resolve 
practical questions. Liberal individualists stress the 
capacity of autonomous individuals to question both the 
appropriateness of prosaic decisions and the implications of 
the premises which underlie them. For communitarians, the 
result is dialogue deficient in democratic legitimacy
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because of the aversion to examinination of the shared 
understandings and precedents which serve as guidelines. For 
liberal individualists, the result is fragmentation of the 
community, and emphasis on differences since there is no way 
to explain agreement except on coincidental bases.
An hermeneutic model of democratic citizenship avoids 
these imbalances, while incorporating significant facets of 
the respective strengths we see in liberal individualism and 
communitarianism. Because its epistemological grounding is 
flexible and inclusive, a hermeneutic model of democratic 
citizenship is capable of nurturing not a detente, but an 
entente, between the liberal individualist and communitarian 
perspectives. This model achieves balance by avoiding the 
confines imposed by either/or approaches. At the level of 
the politics of the self, a hermeneutic model of democratic 
citizenship desists from adopting a heavily constrained view 
of the individual. For this reason, it circumvents the 
resultant dualism which narrows the spheres of action which 
will purportedly be fulfilling to citizens, and which 
ultimately determines the structuration of institutions. The 
hermeneutic model of democracy provides both a theory and 
practical recommendations regarding citizenship which retain 
individuality within commonality.
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